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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no other debate in corporate law has been as persistent as the debate on the optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders. Since the days of Berle and
1
Means, the opposing sides have disputed whether exclusive
board authority or enhanced shareholder rights are better suited to balance the tradeoff between efficient centralized man2
agement and the risk of sub-optimal managerial effort. In the
jargon of economists, this risk is known as managerial moral
3
hazard. For defenders of the traditional board-centric model,
the board’s informational advantage and shareholders’ collective action problems provide the key economic arguments for
4
privileging board power. Conversely, shareholder advocates
claim that shareholders, as residual claimants, are better
placed than directors to effectively control managerial moral
hazard, since directors may be “captured” by opportunistic
5
managers.

1. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS,
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6, 84–89 (rev. ed. 1967).

THE MODERN CORPORA-

2. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2014) (describing the existing balance between boards and shareholders).
3. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF
INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 3 (2001) (defining moral hazard as
the agent taking “an action unobserved by the principal”).
4. See infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 53–66 and accompanying text.
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The debate also shows no signs of waning. On the contrary,
in today’s corporate environment, the debate has intensified
due to recent developments—such as the rise of hedge fund activism—which have shifted the balance of corporate power from
6
boards to shareholders. Board advocates view this change as
harming U.S. corporations. They describe hedge funds as impatient investors whose only aim is boosting a target’s short-term
stock price, regardless of whether it comes at the expense of
7
long-term value creation. In stark contrast, shareholder advocates dismiss the risk of short-termism as marginal relative to
the benefits brought about by the ability of hedge funds to use
governance levers effectively to keep directors and managers
8
accountable.
Proponents of both models, however, agree at least on one
thing. Managerial moral hazard is recognized across-the-board
9
as the information problem of corporate governance. Disagreement is limited merely to whether board power or shareholder power best mitigates this problem.
This Article offers a novel theory of the optimal division of
power between boards and shareholders, arguing that shareholders face problems of adverse selection in addition to classic
problems of managerial moral hazard. Moral hazard arises
when a manager takes “hidden actions” that deviate from op10
timal project selection. Adverse selection, instead, arises when
a manager’s “hidden knowledge” of her skills or the transactional environment makes shareholders unable to separate
“good” managers, who respond to incentives for optimal project
11
selection, from “bad” ones. The coexistence of these information problems points to a much broader governance tradeoff
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 95–103 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (1999) (arguing that the
dominant view in contemporary discussions of corporate governance is that
the “central economic problem addressed by corporation law is reducing ‘agency costs’ by keeping directors and managers faithful to shareholders’ interests”); see also Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1911 (2013) (describing the shareholdermanager agency costs as the master problem of corporate law); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 929
(1984) (describing the challenge of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder desires as the central corporate law issue).
10. See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 3.
11. See id.
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than conventionally understood: attempting to mitigate adverse
selection issues might conflict with trying to control managerial
moral hazard, introducing distortions in the incentives provided to good managers for optimal project selection.
Examined against this broader governance tradeoff, neither the traditional board-centric model nor the shareholder
primacy model can optimize on its terms and thereby maximize
shareholder and aggregate wealth. As this Article will show, a
competing governance model with stronger board authority in
the short term and enhanced shareholder rights in the longer
term instead emerges as the best means of achieving that end.
The key to understanding the economic mechanisms underpinning the moral hazard-adverse selection tradeoff is the
power to remove managers. By default, this power belongs to
the board, as the institution charged with supervising man12
agement. However, if shareholders are displeased with the
way directors serve their monitoring function, they retain the
13
right to remove both incumbent directors and managers. Now,
under the conventional information account of the shareholdermanager relationship, the utility of the shareholders’ power of
removal is that it has an expected cost to incumbents that in14
centivizes them to exert effort and refrain from moral hazard.
Shareholder advocates, in particular, defend the need for a
strong shareholders’ power of removal—exercisable virtually at
any time—in order to ensure that the exercise of this power (or
even just the threat of it) can serve an effective disciplinary
15
function. However, once the problem of adverse selection is
taken into consideration, this account of the shareholders’ removal power is revealed as incomplete.
First, the shareholder advocates’ approach stands against
standard economic assumptions about the use of incentive
compensation as a helpful means to promote managerial ef16
fort. It also runs opposite to the widespread adoption of incen12. See, e.g., Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1060–62 (describing functions and powers of the board of directors).
13. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(affirming the shareholders’ right to remove directors if displeased with their
actions); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994)
(providing a summary of comparable state corporation code provisions).
14. See infra note 51.
15. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
16. The standard reference is to Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May–June 1990, at 138, 143–46.
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tive compensation schemes we observe in the real corporate
17
world.
Second, that approach fails to incorporate the additional
information problem of adverse selection, as well as the limits
of incentive compensation or any other incentive-compatible
18
mechanism for mitigating adverse selection. Indeed, the use of
reward mechanisms can induce a manager to exert effort, but
cannot improve a manager’s skills. For example, they cannot
induce an untalented manager to act as a talented one. And, in
any event, using such mechanisms to induce a bad manager to
“behave”—think of a manager with an excessive taste for private benefits, for example—will typically prove too costly to
19
shareholders. Further, in other contexts, contracting with bad
types will generally remain profitable to principals as long as
they can set ad-hoc contractual terms. For example, consider
the insurance practice of demanding higher insurance premiums from high-risk prospective customers. Conversely, contracting with a bad manager tends to always be unprofitable to
shareholders, as no viable mechanism can compensate shareholders for the losses triggered by a bad manager’s hire.
Viewed through this lens, the shareholder power of remov20
al matters to shareholders primarily as an ex post remedy
against the risk of hiring a bad manager. But the real issue is
that, at the same time, removal may impair the shareholders’
ability to effectively use incentive compensation to promote effort by good managers.
This may occur because the shareholder advocates’ assumption that a firm’s stock price can provide guidance for accurate removal decisions weakens to the extent a manager invests in specific long-term projects where there is a lag between
the time the investment is made and when its value is real21
ized. Classic examples of these projects include investments in
innovation and other intangible “knowledge” assets, such as
ideas, patents, brands, software, copyrights, and the like. The
17. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 9, at 1917–19 (discussing the broad adoption of performance-based pay for CEOs).
18. Economists speak of incentive compatibility when a mechanism (e.g.,
a contractual or legal arrangement) exists that can make it individually profitable for the agent to take actions that maximize the principal’s wealth. See
BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 122–24 (2d ed. 2005).
19. See infra Part II.C.2.
20. In this Article, the term “ex ante” refers to the period of time before
the hiring of a manager, while “ex post” refers to after the hiring of a manager.
21. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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common features of these investments—which have come to
22
constitute the bulk of today’s corporate production —is that, on
the one hand, information on their value tends to be “soft,” i.e.,
difficult for outsiders to verify and therefore less likely to be ac23
curately reflected in stock prices. On the other hand, these investments typically demand large capital expenditures up front
and thus decrease near-term earnings, providing “hard” information that is easier to incorporate into the firm’s current stock
24
price. As a result of these transactional features, prices may
fail to fully capture the implications of a specific long-term investment until those implications begin to show up in cash
flows over time, while being largely uninformative in the shortterm.
Under the possibility of uninformative short-term prices,
theory predicts that shareholder interests are served by a re25
gime of “time-consistent removal decisions.” Under this regime, shareholders would commit to exercise removal only in
the longer term, when market prices can be expected to more
accurately reflect information on the fundamental value of
managerial decisions. In practice, however, when shareholders
are empowered to exercise removal at any time—as advocated
by shareholder defenders—they will be unable to credibly
commit to time-consistent removal decisions for two basic reasons. First, shareholders anticipate that bad managers are statistically more likely to be associated with a disappointing firm
outcome (i.e., low earnings). Second, the short-term inability of
good managers to support communication about the quality of a
specific long-term investment with hard information increases
22. See, e.g., Carol A. Corrado & Charles R. Hulten, How Do You Measure
a “Technological Revolution”?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 99, 103 (2010) (“[T]he innovation that has shaped recent economic growth is not an autonomous event
that falls like manna from heaven. Nor is it a result of R&D and ICT investments alone. Instead, a surge of new ideas (technological or otherwise) is
linked to output growth through a complex process of investments in technological expertise, product design, market development, and organizational capability. This process affects all sources of growth to one extent or another but
is most clearly detected in the growing contribution of intangible capital.”).
23. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 249–50
(2006); see also Alex Edmans et al., The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency
When Some Information Is Soft 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 380/2013, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2316194.
24. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 249; see also Edmans et al., supra note
23 (noting the difficulty for a company to credibly disclose information about
intangible assets).
25. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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the risk that a bad manager might mimic a good manager.
Consequently, shareholders will rationally, but inefficiently, respond to the short-term fall in stock price that may accompany
26
a specific long-term investment by removing the manager.
27
The costs of this “limited commitment problem” affecting
shareholders are not limited to the expected loss of value
caused by the mistaken removal of a good manager. Most importantly for the purpose of this discussion, good managers
struggling to avoid removal can be expected to become likewise
unresponsive to incentives for optimal project selection and engage in “strategic signaling.” This means that they may develop
a preference for passing-up valuable long-term projects, which
they would otherwise choose under the “right” incentive
scheme, in favor of less profitable short-termist projects that
are more likely to increase their chances at being perceived by
28
the shareholders as a good manager.
This analytical framework has crucial positive implications
for the debate over the optimal allocation of corporate power.
First, it exposes short-termism as a much more pervasive problem than recognized by shareholder advocates. Short-termism
is not just the result of the pressure of some shareholders with
29
excessive discounting preferences (e.g., hedge funds). It is, instead, the ultimate consequence of asset pricing inefficiencies
due to adverse selection issues—that is, market imperfections
that affect all shareholders as a matter of course.
Second, this framework reframes board protection from
shareholder pressure as a corrective that “exploits” a board’s
bias toward retaining incumbent management to address these
imperfections. This bias stems from the same reasons that
shareholder advocates argue promote board capture: the “bonds
of interest, collegiality or affinity” that are likely to develop
30
over time between managers and board members. While economic theory and governance practices reject that these bonds
might lead to the drastic consequences drawn by shareholder

26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value
of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73–74, 114–15 (2016) (introducing
the limited commitment problem of shareholders).
28. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (elaborating on the shortterm incentive problem).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 92–98.
30. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 784 (2002).
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advocates, it is plausible that they might induce a board to be
more tolerant than outside investors in evaluating managerial
performance. In light of this bias, a board that is insulated from
shareholder discipline—and hence holds exclusive decisionmaking power on managerial removal decisions—reduces the
risk of inefficient removal of good managers and, hence, short31
termism.
At the same time, what the defenders of a model with exclusive board authority fail to understand is that board protection might jeopardize optimal project selection if it becomes
perpetual, as a board’s bias might grow excessive in the longer
term. Indeed, the same reasons that make a board less inclined
to remove a manager in the short term may make the board
less inclined to remove her in the longer term, even upon the
observation of a disappointing firm outcome that is more likely
32
to accurately signal a bad manager.
As a normative matter, this framework indicates that a
corporate model with strong board authority in the short term
and enhanced shareholder rights in the longer term is better
suited to optimize the moral hazard-adverse selection tradeoff
and, accordingly, maximize shareholder and firm value. Virtually exclusive board authority in the short term—such as the
authority a board is likely to gain through the adoption of de33
fensive measures like staggered boards and poison pills —
harnesses a board’s bias toward retaining incumbent management. This ensures that a board’s bias serves as a commitment
device against inefficient short-term removal decisions and the
consequential risk of short-termism. In the longer term, however, a board’s bias might grow excessive, while prices become
more likely to provide reliable guidance for the efficient exer34
cise of the shareholders’ removal power. Over time, a board’s
exclusive authority over managerial removal decisions should
thus be relaxed in favor of greater shareholder authority,
meaning that the shareholders’ power of removal should not be
constrained by the adoption of defensive measures or any other
hurdles.
However, under the recent rise of empowered shareholders,
boards of directors have grown increasingly less able to gain

31.
32.
33.
34.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
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protection from short-term shareholder pressure. Mainly, this
outcome is due to the decreased effectiveness of defensive
measures, as hedge funds and other activists have gained the
ability to coerce boards to dismiss these defenses or otherwise
35
sneak past them. Consistent with this Article’s theoretical
prediction, recent evidence indicates that the result of these
transformative changes is that corporate America is moving
away from long-term value creation and toward short-term
36
consumption.
To reverse this trend, and at the same time preserve the
long-term benefits of shareholder empowerment, this Article
submits that a coordinated private ordering response by U.S.
boards of directors and institutional investors—who have increasingly voiced concerns about the short-termist effect of
37
hedge fund activism in recent times —would be the most politically feasible option. Crucial to this response would be to reinstate the limitations on short-term shareholder interference as
meaningful high-order constraints. Similar to the function
served by supermajority requirements designed to protect constitutional constraints, a charter provision requiring supermajority approval for the dismissal of defensive measures could
serve this purpose. At the same time, these limitations should
have a finite, rather than perpetual, life. To this end, such
measures should automatically expire as a company transitions
from the short term to the long term. Further, this Article also
explores modifications to the Delaware courts’ approach to the
use of defensive measures that would facilitate the adoption of
this and other desirable changes to improve corporate govern38
ance in U.S. corporations.
This Article continues as follows. Part I frames the terms
of debate in which this Article intervenes, reviewing the competing cases for board primacy and shareholder primacy and
illustrating how recent changes in legal and market practices
have advanced the case for stronger shareholder rights. Part II
looks into the debate’s economic stakes, pushing back against
the claim that managerial moral hazard is the problem in the
shareholder-manager relationship and showing that moral
hazard coexists with the additional information problem of adverse selection. Part III discusses the positive implications aris35.
36.
37.
38.

See infra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 185, 209–13.
See infra Part V.B.
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ing from these competing information problems, demonstrating
that their coexistence exposes shareholders to a broader governance tradeoff than conventionally understood. Part IV explores the normative implications of the moral hazard-adverse
selection tradeoff, concluding that a governance model with exclusive board authority in the short term and enhanced shareholder rights in the longer term emerges as better positioned to
facilitate this tradeoff than either the traditional board-centric
model or the shareholder primacy model. Part V discusses the
policy implications that this Article’s novel theory of board and
shareholder power bears in light of the recent rise of empowered shareholders. Lastly, the Appendix provides a numerical
example to add concreteness to this Article’s claims.
I. WHITHER CORPORATE MODEL?
This Part lays out the basic terms of the debate on the optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders. It
begins, in Section A, by reviewing the contrasting economic arguments in favor of board primacy and shareholder primacy.
Section B then illustrates how recent changes in legal and
market practices have contributed to advancing the case for
shareholder primacy.
A. BOARD PRIMACY AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
According to the canonical view of corporate governance,
the risk of managerial moral hazard explains why the corporate
form presumes the adoption of a board structure alongside cen39
tralized management. Day-to-day business decisions are dele39. This Article uses the term “board advocates” to identify a school of
thought that defends the centrality of the board of directors as an institutional
remedy to the managerial moral hazard problem. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550, 559–74 (2003); William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
653, 658–61 (2010); Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate
Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1657–61 (2011); Martin
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 130–31
(1979); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1759, 1777 (2006). Excluded from this group of scholars are two prominent voices defending board primacy—Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout. Blair
and Stout challenge the principal-agent model of the firm and suggest that a
“team-production model” capturing the role of other corporate stakeholders is
descriptively more accurate. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 249. Blair and
Stout also challenge the view that corporate law’s goal is to maximize share-

2017]

BOARD AND SHAREHOLDER POWER

1387

gated to managers, as “agents with valuable relevant
40
knowledge” that dispersed shareholders tend to lack. This
separation of ownership and control efficiently allows share41
holders to specialize in risk bearing, facilitating the aggrega42
tion of large capital pools. However, it also creates the risk
that managers may opportunistically abuse their business decision-making power, taking “hidden actions” in their own selfinterest and at the expense of shareholders. In response to this
risk, corporate law grants ultimate control over the corporate
43
affairs to the board of directors, as the institution charged
44
with ratifying and monitoring management decisions. To this
end, among others, board members have the power of selecting
the CEO and top executives, setting executive compensation
arrangements, deciding on the removal of management, and
45
taking major corporate decisions.
For board advocates, collective action problems and asymmetric information provide the key economic arguments for
privileging this allocation of corporate powers. Unlike shareholders—these advocates argue—the board of directors can act
as an efficient central decision-maker within the corporation,
avoiding issues of rational apathy and enjoying privileged ac46
cess to corporate information. The need to protect the board’s
informational advantage from the interference of less-informed

holder value. See id. at 253. Conversely, this Article still embraces shareholder
value maximization and the principal-agent model of the firm, but criticizes
the standard corporate law approach to that model as incomplete insofar as it
fails to consider the additional information problem of adverse selection.
40. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 308 (1983).
41. See id.
42. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 10, 10 (1991).
43. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
44. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 306 (1985) (“The
board of directors thus arises endogenously, as a means by which to safeguard
the investments of those who face a diffuse but significant risk of expropriation because the assets in question are numerous and ill-defined and cannot be
protected in a well-focused, transaction-specific way.”); Benjamin E. Hermalin
& Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined
Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON.
POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 7, 9.
45. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1060–62.
46. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 550; Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 39, at 659–60.
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shareholders also explains why the traditional corporate model
vests shareholders with only a limited capacity to intervene in
47
corporate affairs. At the same time, according to board advocates, this model performs an efficient balancing act between
board authority and accountability. It does so by granting
shareholders the right to appoint directors (and vote on their
48
tenure at periodic elections) and the benefit of fiduciary du49
ties. Further, this model also grants shareholders the power
to remove board members and their appointed officials, the
50
managers—either through a proxy contest or by selling their
shares to an outside bidder in the context of a hostile takeo51
ver. The power of removal—or even just the threat of it—
provides shareholders obvious utility, as its expected cost to in52
cumbents incentivizes greater effort.
47. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless
Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 3–
4 (2010). Aside from the exercise of veto rights over some fundamental corporate transactions, shareholders lack the right to direct the management of the
corporation. See generally Edward Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
183 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW] (describing
the traditional governance rights of shareholders).
48. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 357–400 (1986)
(providing a general discussion of shareholders’ voting rights).
49. While Delaware courts have sometimes articulated the requirement of
fiduciary duty as being owed to the corporation, the operation of this requirement has consistently identified the interests of the shareholders as proxy for
the interest of the corporation. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of
Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1, 52–58 (2004).
50. Ordinarily removal rights follow appointment rights. See Luca
Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders
as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 47, at 55, 60
(“Indeed, one might say that directors are normally ‘removed’ by dropping
their names from the company’s slate or by failing to reelect them.”) But
shareholders are also granted the extraordinary power to remove directors before the end of their terms. In particular, Delaware treats the shareholders’
power to remove directors without cause as a statutory default subject to reversal, unless a board is staggered (in which case removal needs to be for
cause). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2001).
51. See John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 47, at 35, 41 (describing this kind of
removal as a “right of transfer” belonging to the shareholders).
52. See id. (discussing the disciplinary function of the exercise of removal
power through the sale of shares in the context of a takeover transaction); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
676–77, 680–82 (2007) (discussing the disciplinary function of the shareholder
franchise).
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In stark contrast, shareholder advocates argue that shareholders lack effective remedies to hold directors accountable,
challenging the board’s ability to serve as a faithful guardian of
53
shareholder interests. According to these scholars, fiduciary
rules provide weak deterrence against moral hazard, as such
rules are of uncertain application, are excessively costly to en54
force, and are too vague. Most importantly, they argue the
shareholders’ power of removal is “largely a myth” as a result of
55
“managerial entrenchment” and “board capture.”
Entrenchment arises when directors and managers gain
protection from the threat of removal through the adoption of
defensive measures that make it difficult for shareholders to
56
replace incumbents. Classic examples of such measures include poison pills and staggered boards. A poison pill, also
called a shareholders’ rights plan, is a defensive measure that
so dilutes a bidder’s economic rights that the only way to complete a takeover is to first appoint a new majority of directors
57
who can remove it. When a board is staggered, however, a
58
bidder’s ability to do so is substantially reduced. This is because in a staggered board directors are commonly grouped into
three different classes and each class stands for reelection in
successive years. Hence, a prospective bidder needs to endure
the costly delay of waiting through two election cycles before
53. Notably, the leading voice among shareholder advocates is Harvard
Law School’s Lucian Bebchuk. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 851–75 (2005) (advocating for the expansion of shareholder governance rights as a remedy against
the ineffectiveness of board monitoring); Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 694–711
(advocating for a reform of corporate elections so as to make directors more
accountable to shareholders).
54. See Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113, 141–42 (providing a summary of the standard arguments articulated against the effectiveness of fiduciary duties).
55. Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 732.
56. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 788 (2009).
57. A poison pill consists of stock purchase rights that are granted to existing shareholders in the event a corporate raider accumulates more than a
certain threshold of outstanding stock, and which entitle the existing shareholders (but not the raider) to acquire newly issued stock at a substantial discount from the market price. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share
Purchase Rights Plans, in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW
AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 3, 4–12 (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (setting forth terms of a standard poison pill).
58. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893,
907 (2002).
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being able to replace a majority of the board. Further, entrenchment is also favored by incumbents’ exclusive access to
the corporation’s proxy machinery, which shareholder advocates argue raises prohibitive procedural costs for prospective
59
challengers.
Because entrenchment weakens the disciplining effect of
removal, shareholder advocates claim it allows top executives
to capture the board, making directors subservient to management or simply ineffective at fulfilling their monitoring func60
tion. For theses advocates, the clearest evidence of board capture would is the ability of executives to extract “pay-without61
performance” : high-powered compensation schemes that pay
executives more than “the minimum expected monetary payoff
62
to be left [to agents] to preserve incentives” (i.e., what econo63
mists call “information rents”). This approach stands in clear
contrast with the conventional economic account of incentive
compensation as the most effective way to reign in managerial
64
moral hazard. Indeed, shareholder advocates remain skeptical
65
that incentive-compatible compensation arrangements can be
designed in practice. In their view, board capture negates an
essential premise of incentive compatibility: that principals can
66
take an adversarial position against agents.
In response to these inefficiencies, shareholder advocates
demand to strengthen the governance powers of shareholders—
in particular, the power of promptly removing directors and
67
managers. Only by ensuring that shareholders enjoy a power

59. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 688–91.
60. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 30, at 754, 783–86.
61. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 8, 61–79, 80–82
(2004).
62. TIROLE, supra note 23, at 117.
63. See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 3, at 29.
64. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 16, at 8–10.
65. See SALANIÉ, supra note 18 (providing a definition of incentive compatibility).
66. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 30.
67. See Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 677. Among other proposals, shareholder advocates have called for the adoption of majority voting, the “right to
replace all incumbents every two or three years,” the right to expanded “access
to the proxy statement” and the “reimbursement of solicitation expenses,” the
“access to management’s proxy statements,” and the “power to trump contrary
board-adopted bylaws” and adopt “shareholder-initiated charter amendments.”
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 39, at 671–73 (providing a summary description of these proposals).
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of removal unencumbered by the adoption of defensive
measures (or hurdles affecting the proxy process)—they argue—can shareholders’ control over the corporation have teeth
68
and corporate governance be placed on new solid foundations.
Economically, this argument rests on Jensen and Meckling’s
69
classical principal-agent framing of corporate relationships.
That framing recasts shareholders as principals—residual
claimants that have the best incentives to constrain managerial
moral hazard and maximize firm value, unlike potentially cap70
tured boards.
Furthermore, shareholder advocates maintain that the efficiency of stock prices largely mitigates any alleged coordination and information problems that could prevent shareholders
from exercising corporate control effectively. In contrast with
what is argued by board advocates, stock prices could be relied
upon to reliably convey information on the value implications of
71
managerial and directorial decisions. Additionally, as discussed in the following Section, the emergence of a new class of
sophisticated investors and recent regulatory developments
would have further reduced the informational gaps between
boards and shareholders and, therefore, enhanced the ability of
shareholders to effectively provide value-increasing governance
inputs.
B. THE RISE OF EMPOWERED SHAREHOLDERS
Shareholder advocates have been engaged in a battle to reform the traditional board-centric model of the corporation for
over three decades, since the late 1970s. For most of this time,
this battle has favored directors and managers. Since the early
2000s, however, the balance of corporate power has shifted rather dramatically as a result of several changes occurring in
both regulation and market practices that have promoted
shareholder empowerment.

68. See Bebchuk, supra note 52, at 732.
69. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 308–10 (1976).
70. Id.
71. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). The theoretical underpinning
here is the semi-strong form of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
(ECMH), under which market prices accurately reflect all available public information on firm outcomes. See id.
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Of all these changes, perhaps the most salient has been the
72
rise of activist hedge funds. Unlike the dispersed investors
stereotyped by Berle and Means or the largely defendant insti73
tutional investors of yesteryear, activist hedge funds routinely
rely on the proactive use of governance levers in order to pur74
sue near or intermediate term investment objectives. In doing
so, they have drawn heavily on the moral hazard-reductive
playbook of shareholder advocates, seeking increased leverage,
pressing for the return of excess cash to shareholders, forcing
the sale of non-core corporate assets, and engaging in cost75
cutting initiatives. On top of all this—again, consistent with
the shareholder advocates’ demand for strengthening shareholders’ removal power—the funds have often sought the re76
placement of incumbent CEOs and other top executives.
Most frequently, hedge funds have pushed for these chang77
es by launching proxy fights or threatening to do so, typically
seeking, and often gaining, the support of institutional inves78
tors. The activists’ newly founded ability to use proxy fights
72. In the period 2010–15, one out of two S&P 500 companies had an activist fund on its share register and one out of seven received an activist attack. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, ECONOMIST (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www
.economist.com/news/leaders/21642169-why-activist-investors-are-good
-public-company-capitalisms-unlikely-heroes. In 2014 alone, activists launched
344 campaigns against U.S. public companies (up from 291 in 2013). Taking
Care of Business: A Look at Shareholder Activism in 2014 and Beyond, ACTIVIST INSIGHT ACTIVIST INVESTING REV., 2015, at 8.
73. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future
of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 56–58 (2011)
(drawing a distinction between the “defensive” activism of institutional investors, directed at taking actions to protect existing investments, and the “offensive” activism of hedge funds, directed at seeking targets to fit their agenda for
activism).
74. The high-powered compensation structure of hedge fund managers,
the concentration of the funds’ investments in just a few targeted companies,
greater regulatory freedom, and smaller exposure to liquidity shocks are the
primary factors explaining why activism is a rational profit-making strategy
for these corporate actors. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds
in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021,
1064–66, 1069–70 (2007).
75. E.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 39, at 683; Alon Brav et al.,
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J.
FIN. 1729, 1741–45 (2008) (describing the five major categories of hedge funds’
stated objectives).
76. See Brav et al., supra note 75, at 1743–45 (detailing the tendency and
success rates of such hostile tactics).
77. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets,
95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1403–05 (2007) (providing a sample of proxy contests).
78. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
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effectively was made possible by the “modernization” process of
proxy rules, which the Security and Exchange Commission
79
(SEC) began in the 1990s. This process has made it considerably easier and cheaper for insurgents to engage in a proxy contest. Activists have also significantly gained by the switch to
majority voting, which has come to replace plurality voting at
80
most public companies. Under majority voting, only nominees
who receive a majority of the votes cast are elected to the
board. As a result, vote withholding (or “just say no”) campaigns have acquired direct legal significance today, since
shareholders can effectively use these campaigns to throw incumbents out of office without having to file a proxy statement
81
with the SEC.
Besides hedge funds, proxy advisory firms are the other
new corporate governance player that has largely contributed
to the empowerment of shareholders. These firms today play a
major role in influencing corporate governance policies at many
U.S. corporations, as they provide most institutional investors
with voting recommendations on any matter on which share82
holders vote. In providing these services, proxy advisors
strongly support the proposition that “enhanced shareholder

Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013).
79. See generally Thomas Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New
Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 686–94
(2007) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the changes in proxy rules
that facilitated hedge fund activism).
80. Stephen Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2016) (“Over the last decade, the move
from plurality to majority voting for corporate directors has been one of the
most popular and successful corporate governance reform efforts.”).
81. Withhold (or “just say no”) campaigns involve the withholding of votes
on specific governance issues, such as the election of directors. Before the
adoption of majority voting, withhold campaigns could at best cause embarrassment to director nominees. Under majority voting, they have become potent weapons to defeat incumbent directors. See Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1020–21 (2010) (discussing the
passage from plurality to majority voting).
82. See generally K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 746 (2016) (“Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) alone, the largest proxy advisory firm,
claims to advise over 1,600 clients, who manage over $25 trillion in assets.”
(citing Robert D. Hershey, A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, at B6)); Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 898–906 (2007) (discussing six of such advisory
firms).
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rights are consistent with best governance practices.” At the
same time, they oppose the adoption of defensive arrangements
as inconsistent with such practices.
84
As a result of these developments —especially activists’
newly founded ability to remove incumbents at virtually any
time—shareholders are today increasingly able to influence
both governance practices and investment policies. Meanwhile,
board power has been correspondingly eroded. The most telling
evidence of this shift in the balance of corporate power is the
changes that occurred in the use of defensive measures. While
directors theoretically have a veto power over destaggering de85
cisions, in recent years they have increasingly acquiesced to
86
destaggering proposals under the pressure exerted by both
87
88
proxy advisors and activist shareholders. The use of the poi83. Cremers et al., supra note 82, at 746–47.
84. Other significant changes that have contributed to empowering
shareholders include: amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law
that have granted shareholders greater access to the ballot box, the introduction of say-on-pay shareholder votes, and a further expansion of the scope of
shareholder proposals to effect changes in corporate election procedures. Id. at
799–800.
85. This is so as long as the staggered board is established in the charter,
in which case destaggering involves the coordinated action of the board and
the shareholders, as charter amendments can be initiated only by the board
and require shareholder approval. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)
(2017); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). Conversely,
shareholders can unilaterally dismiss a staggered board established in the bylaws, as board initiative is not required for bylaw amendments. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2017); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(a)–(b) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2010). Most staggered boards, however, are established in the charter. Cremers & Sepe, supra note 27, at 94 n.140.
86. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 27, at 98–99 (documenting that lower
staggered board levels over time are largely due to increased destaggering rather than a fall in staggering events).
87. The recommendation that companies should have a unitary board, or
else shareholders should seek a destaggering proposal, figures among the most
important voting guidelines that proxy advisors routinely provide to investors.
See, e.g., INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDELINES 10 (2013), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/2014ISSUSSummary
Guidelines.pdf.
88. Activist shareholders have increasingly resorted to precatory proposals and the threat of vote-withholding campaigns to pursue board
destaggering at several companies, and with growing success. The Harvard
Shareholder Rights Project (SRP) alone, a clinical program established at
Harvard Law School to assist institutional investors in the submission of
precatory proposals to destagger the board, has “contributed to board
[destaggering] at about 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies” in just three
years. SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, http://srp.law.harvard.edu (last visited
Feb. 27, 2017).
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son pill has similarly declined—again, largely as a result of the
89
war waged against it by proxy advisors and activist investors.
Further, poison pills also seem to have grown less effective in
circumstances involving an activist attack. This has occurred in
part because the support of institutional shareholders has enabled hedge funds to wage victorious proxy contests with stakes
that remain below common pill-triggering thresholds, in part
because the funds’ bargaining levers have proved increasingly
90
successful in coercing boards to remove the pill “willingly.”
II. ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE SHAREHOLDERMANAGER RELATIONSHIP
Unsurprisingly, the rise of empowered shareholders has reignited the debate about the optimal balance of corporate powers. For board advocates, this development makes the current
case for shielding boards from shareholder and market pressure more compelling than ever. In contrast, shareholder advocates view activist shareholders—and, in particular, hedge
funds—as the natural champions of the long-dormant shareholder franchise. Yet, despite these opposing views about the
respective role of boards and shareholders, both board advocates and shareholder advocates share a common predisposition to regard managerial moral hazard as the problem to be
addressed in corporate law.
Economic theory, however, has long shown that the most
pervasive information problem is “adverse selection”: as put by
Nobel Laureate in economics George Akerlof, “the difficulty of
91
distinguishing good quality from bad.” In the corporate context, this difficulty translates into the inability of shareholders
to separate “good” managers, whose incentives to act opportun-

89. Stephen M. Gill et al., Structural Defenses to Shareholder Activism, 47
REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 151, 170 n.162 (2014) (“Whereas 57% of the
S&P 500 companies had poison pills at the end of 2003, only 7% had pills in
place at the end of 2013.” (citation omitted)).
90. The recent battle fought for the control of the board of Sotheby’s is
emblematic. After having adopted a pill in the attempt to defeat the attack of
activist investor Third Point, the board decided to “willingly” remove it. Significantly, this decision took place after the board had obtained a favorable
judgment by the Delaware Chancery Court that the use of a two-tier pill (i.e.,
a pill providing for different triggering thresholds for activist and non-activist
investors) was not “preclusive.” See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, C.A., No.
9469–VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *2, *14, *19 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
91. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 500 (1970).
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istically and deviate from optimal project selection, can be redressed through reward mechanisms, from “bad” ones, who do
not respond to such reward mechanisms.
The matter is not just about academic rigor, but rather involves two critical descriptive points, which bear crucial normative implications. This Part takes up the first point, showing
that adverse selection issues matters as much as issues of moral hazard in the shareholder-manager relationship. The second
point is addressed in Part III, where this Article shows that a
more complex corporate governance tradeoff emerges once the
information problems arising from the separation of ownership
and control are considered in full. Corporate law’s fundamental
optimization problem is not simply how to incentivize managerial effort despite shareholders being unable to observe the actions a manager takes. Rather it is how to do so when shareholders do not know whether they are dealing with a good or
bad manager, and when attempts at getting rid of bad managers can introduce distortions on the moral hazard front.
A. REASSESSING THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF POWER DEBATE
As highlighted in the Introduction, board advocates view
the rise of empowered shareholders as harming U.S. corporations. Empowered shareholders, they argue, both jeopardize the
board’s informational advantage and exacerbate issues of short92
termism. In the standard rendering, short-termism results
from the risk that “impatient” shareholders with near-term liquidity needs might pressure companies to undertake investments “that are profitable in the short term but value93
decreasing in the long term.” Classic examples include cutting
specific investments that would pay off later on or undertaking
projects that deliver cash on the nails at the expense of longterm profitability. Further, board advocates reject the claim of
market price robustness, asserting that market prices provide
at best an imperfect informational focal point for the exercise of
94
shareholder governance.

92. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves
Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1639–40, 1651 (2013); see also id.
at 1639 nn.2–6, 1640 nn.7–11 (collecting the most important contributions expressing short-termism concerns).
93. Id. at 1638.
94. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 39, at 696 (“Information
asymmetries make it difficult for the market to project accurately . . . .”).
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To these criticisms, shareholder advocates respond that,
first, short-termist concerns have marginal relevance relative
to the much more pervasive problem of managerial moral haz95
ard.
Indeed, some shareholders—hedge funds, in the first
96
place —may plausibly have liquidity needs that induce them to
undertake lucrative short-term investments at the expense of
97
long-term firm results. But this kind of behavior cannot reasonably be presumed to constitute a systemic shareholder is98
sue. Conversely, managerial moral hazard is a problem affecting all shareholders.
Second, shareholder advocates argue that portraying today’s shareholders as necessarily less informed than board
members fails to take into account both investors’ increased sophistication and the changes that have occurred in board composition. Activist investors such as hedge funds possess both
the incentives and the resources to act as “governance entrepreneurs” that specialize in monitoring and providing govern99
ance and strategic inputs. Along the same lines, institutional
shareholders can rely on proxy advisory firms, which increas100
ingly act as “central coordinating and information agents,” to
gather information regarding governance at particular firms.
Accordingly, one could no longer assume that hedge funds and
institutional investors necessarily stand at an informational
disadvantage relative to independent directors, who have come
101
to occupy the largest fraction of seats in most U.S. boards.
95. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 92, at 1651 (rejecting the view that depicts “the long-term costs of shareholder power and activism as large and the
threats posed by them as grave”); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism: In
the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 1004 (2012) (arguing
that short-termism “is insufficiently strong, empirically and theoretically, to
affect corporate rulemaking”).
96. Kahan & Rock, supra note 74, at 1083 (“Hedge funds come close to being the archetypal short-term investor. For some funds, holding shares for a
full day represents a ‘long-term’ investment.”).
97. The empirical evidence on the long-term effect of hedge fund activism
is mixed; most recent empirical studies seem to support the view that hedge
fund activism is detrimental in the longer term. For a recent review, see
Martijn Cremers et al., Activist Hedge Funds and the Corporation, 94 WASH.
U. L. REV. 16–21 (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
98. See Roe, supra note 95, at 980, 1005.
99. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 78, at 897.
100. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 1007.
101. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in
the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
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Unlike executive directors, independent directors typically have
full-time jobs elsewhere and can therefore devote relatively lit102
tle time to their board functions. Further, they also tend to
have little firm-specific knowledge or skills, as the emphasis
placed on independence requirements in current rules governing the board appointment process has sacrificed expertise re103
quirements.
These arguments fairly project today’s shareholders as well
positioned to exercise corporate control. Under this projection,
the case for preferring shareholder primacy to board primacy is
considerably strengthened. If enhanced principal control can
reduce the expected cost of managerial moral hazard and
shareholders are now in the position to exercise principal control effectively, then one must conclude that enhancing shareholder power increases firm value. This argument is as
straightforward as it could be. But therein lies the problem. For
the shareholder advocates’ argument rests on a crucial oversimplifying assumption about the information structure of the
shareholder-manager relationship: that shareholders are immune to the additional, and fundamental, information problem
104
of adverse selection.
As with moral hazard, conflicting objectives and asymmetric information are the basic ingredients of adverse selection. In
the case of adverse selection, however, the agent’s private information involves “hidden knowledge” about her characteristics or the execution of the delegated task. Collectively, in the
105
jargon of economists, this is known as the agent’s “type.” In
particular, in the corporate context, a manager will tend to
have exclusive information on both her ability to run a business
and the actual conditions of that business. A manager’s skills in
running different investment projects, the amount of effort these projects require, their intrinsic quality, or the room such projects offer for private benefits extraction all provide illustrations of the hidden knowledge managers are likely to have on
102. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1061.
103. See id. at 1066.
104. The 2001 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was shared by three economists who did the most to call attention to the inefficiencies created by adverse selection—George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz. Press
Release, The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001 (Oct. 10, 2001), http://www
.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/press.html.
105. See Akerlof, supra note 91, at 491 (introducing the classic treatment of
adverse selection in the product market, i.e., between buyers and sellers).
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both her skills and a business condition. Because of this information asymmetry, “bad” managerial types might be able to
mimic “good” types, to the detriment of shareholders.
While challenging the desirability of shareholder primacy,
board advocates similarly ignore the adverse selection issues
that arise in the shareholder-manager relationship. In fact, discussions of adverse selection in the existing corporate law
scholarship have largely been constrained to investor protection in capital markets. Put simply, adverse selection has been
described as an issue affecting the quality of publicly traded securities, with the difficulty lying in screening out low-quality
106
107
issuers. Virtually no attention, instead, has been paid to
the effects of adverse selection on managerial incentives—that
is, to adverse selection issues arising within the boundaries of
the firm. The ensuing discussion endeavors to fill this gap in
the literature, showing that issues of adverse selection cannot
be assumed away from the shareholder-manager relationship,
as shareholders lack the means to separate good managers
from bad ones.
B. HIDDEN ACTIONS AND HIDDEN KNOWLEDGE
In order to better understand why an analytical framework
that only incorporates the problem of managerial moral hazard
has limited explanatory reach, it is helpful to begin by briefly
reviewing the differences between moral hazard and adverse
selection issues as stylized in formal economic models.
108
In moral hazard models, the principal cannot observe
what action an agent ultimately will take, but is assumed to
anticipate perfectly: (i) the agent’s type; (ii) the agent’s available actions (which are essentially determined by the agent’s
type); (iii) the payoff associated with the agent’s actions (which
also is a function of the type); (iv) the mapping between the
agent’s effort and performance; and (v) the agent’s payoff func-

106. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 51, at 40.
107. Two substantial exceptions include Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387 (1991) (providing a seminal
treatment of adverse selection in the corporate context, although focusing on
the creditor-firm relationship rather than the shareholder-manager relationship), and Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic
Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277 (1998)
(employing an adverse selection model to examine the economics of the corporate opportunity doctrine).
108. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 115.
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tion and how it varies depending on available actions. As applied to the corporate context, these assumptions imply that
the shareholders will, for example, know whether a manager
has sufficient industry expertise, what kind of projects she has
available, what cash flows these projects are expected to deliver
and how their distribution changes depending on the level of
managerial effort, and, finally, how the manager’s payoff function changes depending on the available projects and the
amount of effort each project requires.
On the contrary, in adverse selection models, the principal
lacks knowledge about the agent’s specific characteristics or the
execution of the delegated task. In this context, the principal
only anticipates: (i) the general characteristics of agent types,
such as the different skills exhibited by good and bad managers; (ii) the distribution of types, such as the percentage of good
and bad managers in the market; and (iii) the payoffs associated with each type (which are assumed to be a function of the
type), such as the cash flows that the hire of a good or bad
110
manager is expected to deliver.
Under these different information constraints, principals
bear different information costs. In general terms, moral hazard costs arise because the principal faces the problem of inducing effort by the agent, despite being unable to condition the
agent’s payoff on the actions the agent takes. Under adverse selection, instead, the problem for the principal is to induce the
agent to reveal her hidden knowledge, so that the principal can
separate good and bad types and reward (or punish) them accordingly.
For ease of tractability, formal models of moral hazard and
adverse selections tend to separately focus on each of these
problems. In actuality, however, principals—including shareholders—can be presumed to simultaneously face both issues of
moral hazard and adverse selection. A stylized illustration is
helpful to better clarify this point as well as to add concreteness
to the differences between moral hazard and adverse selection
111
problems. Consider a company—specifically, an information

109. See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 74, 75–76 (1979) (modeling the principal’s monetary payoff as a function of both the agent’s unobservable actions, i.e., effort, and a random state of
nature, with the expected realization of the principal’s monetary payoff increasing in the agent’s effort level).
110. See Akerlof, supra note 91, at 489–99.
111. The illustration introduced in this Section provides the basic setting
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technology manufacturer—which needs to hire a manager to
run its business. As standard in principal-agent models, let us
represent the shareholders as principals and the manager as
112
agent. While this representation simplifies the internal organization of the public corporation, it causes no loss of generality for the purpose of the present discussion. Consistent with
standard assumptions in adverse selection models, let us also
assume that the shareholders know that “Good Managers” represent 80% of the overall managerial population, while “Bad
Managers” represent the remaining 20%. This assumption is
also realistic in the context of a developed capital market, such
as the U.S. market, where adverse selection can be presumed to
be relatively mild.
Only three kinds of projects are available to the company—
“Regular,” “Innovative,” and “Bad” projects—and the company’s
business only lasts two periods—identified as the short term
and the long term, at the end of which the company is liquidat113
ed. In reality, of course, a company will have many more
available projects to choose from, which will also tend to develop along multiple periods (i.e., years). Nevertheless, these further assumptions cause, again, no loss of generality for the
purpose of this discussion.
The Regular Project involves the production of an updated
version of a computer that the company has now produced and
marketed for some time. The Innovative Project, instead, involves the production of a new, advanced-technology computer
and, as such, requires the exercise of greater managerial effort.
For example, the Innovative Project might demand the manager to work longer hours, or require her to make some unpopular
decisions, such as cutting corporate perks to fund the development of the more advanced technology, or firing several company engineers in order to hire a new, more talented team that
has greater chances to succeed in developing the new technology.

for an example that is used throughout this Article’s discussion, and presented
in an expanded version in the Appendix.
112. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 115.
113. As a reference point to identify these periods with more concreteness,
note that the average tenure of U.S. CEOs is around seven years. See Steven
N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12
INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 58 (2012) (documenting that, from 1992 to 2007, for a sample of large U.S. companies, the average CEO turnover was about seven
years).
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Because choosing the Regular Project over the Innovative
Project allows the manager to save the cost of exercising greater effort, the Regular Project can be described as delivering the
manager a private benefit or, put differently, as providing a
114
stylized representation of managerial moral hazard. From the
shareholders’ perspective, however, while being more uncertain, the Innovative Project is more desirable than the Regular
Project. Indeed, while the development of a new computer is
likely to involve higher up-front costs as well as greater potential difficulties and delays, if successful, it is also likely to give
the company a significant advantage over competitors in the
longer term. On the contrary, while being more likely to generate returns in the short term, a computer that the company has
produced for some time can be expected to become outdated in
the longer term.
Unlike the Regular Project, the Bad Project involves the
pursuing of an obsolete technology that the manager has an interest in keeping in place because of some hidden knowledge,
rather than because she can exert hidden actions that allow her
to save the cost of effort. For example, the manager may lack
the talent to undertake a better project, or she may have personally invested in the project and stubbornly think—either be115
116
cause of hubris, excessive optimism or specific risk prefer117
ences —that the project has better prospects than it does in
actuality or, still, that abandoning such a project might be in118
terpreted as an admission of failure on her part. Additional
114. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 115.
115. See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J.
BUS. 197, 197 (1986) (arguing that managerial “hubris” may result in overinvestment).
116. See generally Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2661 (2005) (focusing on the
distortions arising from managerial “overconfidence”).
117. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and
Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29
(1969) (discussing the risk-averse implications that may arise out of “the managerial tendency to identify with the enterprise and the desire for security”);
Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, Managerial Incentives and Capital
Management, 101 Q.J. ECON. 835, 836–38 (1986) (demonstrating formally that
career concerns may induce a general reluctance on the part of managers to
undertake new investment projects).
118. See Arnoud W.A. Boot, Why Hang on to Losers? Divestitures and
Takeovers, 47 J. FIN. 1401, 1408–09 (1992) (showing that managers may be
reluctant to either liquidate or divest poorly performing lines of business, for
fear that such actions will be interpreted as an admission of failure on their
part). For more concrete illustrations of bad projects falling along these lines,
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illustrations of hidden managerial knowledge that may explain
the undertaking of a Bad Project may involve the manager’s
ability to extract forms of private benefits that go beyond saving the cost of effort. For example, the Bad Project may involve
a supplier with whom the manager has a preexisting personal
relationship that would be jeopardized if the manager chose
another project or may grant the manager exclusive opportunities for personal networking. Of course, from the shareholders’
perspective the Bad Project is the least desirable as pursuing
an obsolete technology may arguably be assumed to be less
profitable than the restyling of a current computer or the production of an innovative one.
These stylized representations of the possible projects
available to the manager more tangibly capture the difference
between the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection.
Indeed, a manager will be Bad—and hence pose an adverse selection problem—when her specific skills, preferences or the
conditions of the business in which she operates constrain her
to the choice of a Bad Project. On the contrary, a manager will
be Good but rationally opportunistic—and hence pose a moral
hazard problem—when her specific skills, preferences or the
119
conditions of the business in which she operates exclude that
she may undertake a Bad Project, but still leave open the possibility that she may choose the Regular Project over the Innovative Project. Further, the illustration also helps to better see
the implications of the coexistence of moral hazard and adverse
selection issues in the shareholder-manager relationship. Because information asymmetry makes shareholders unable to
verify both the actions managers take and their types, they are
exposed both to the risk of hiring a Good Manager who will unsee Isabelle Royer, Why Bad Projects Are So Hard To Kill, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Feb. 2003), https://hbr.org/2003/02/why-bad-projects-are-so-hard-to-kill.
119. For simplicity, as standard in adverse selection models, the example
in the text assumes that the quality of the project available to a manager depends on her type. This assumption, however, is not strictly necessary to stylize adverse selection in the shareholder-manager relationship, as a manager
may—and often will—acquire private information on the quality of available
projects over the course of her employment. See Talley, supra note 107, at 281.
Accordingly, there are two ways of interpreting the example’s setting. One can
either imagine, as noted in the text, that the described setting captures the
adverse selection issues that arise when the manager is hired, posing that the
manager’s expertise gives her access to prospectively superior information
about the business. Alternatively, one can imagine a situation in which the
issue is the review of managerial compensation, in which case the manager
will have more direct private information on the business conditions.
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dertake the Regular Project rather than the Innovative Project
and that of hiring a Bad Manager, who will undertake the Bad
Project.
C. ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ASSUMING AWAY ADVERSE
SELECTION
The above discussion helps to better grasp the implications
of assuming away adverse selection issues from the shareholder-manager relationship, as commonly done both by shareholder advocates and board advocates. Doing so is equivalent to assuming the existence of incentive-compatible mechanisms that
make it profitable to a manager to disclose information about
her type.
As hinted to above, in the case of moral hazard, the standard incentive-compatible mechanism to incentivize effort is to
anchor managerial compensation to observable firm out120
comes. Although challenged by shareholder advocates, the rationale behind incentive compensation schemes is that the cost
to a manager of exerting effort is outweighed by the expected
reward she receives for improved performance, which makes
the exercise of effort individually efficient for the manager.
Along the same lines, in the case of adverse selection, a
contract is deemed to be incentive compatible when it makes it
in the agent’s interest to truthfully reveal her information, pre121
venting bad types from mimicking good types. A solution to
this end is offering the agent a menu of contractual choices—a
collection of payoff-relevant alternatives—designed in such a
way that the agent’s choice within the menu reveals her private
information. In particular, as specified by contract theory, separating mechanisms can be designed either according to a mod122
el of “screening,” under which the principal takes action—as,
for example, with an insurer’s request of an insurance deducti123
ble. Alternatively, such mechanisms can be designed accord120. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
121. See Roger B. Myerson, Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic
Theory, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 586, 587 (2008).
122. See Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90
Q.J. ECON. 629, 639–40 (1976) (introducing a seminal treatment of screening
mechanisms where poorly informed agents extract information from the better
informed, such as in the insurance context).
123. The intuition here is that only good types (i.e., low-risk prospective
customers) will be willing to accept the deductible, as their lower risk propensity makes them less likely to end up paying it. See id.
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ing to a model of “signaling,” under which the agent takes ac124
tion, for example, with the offering of a seller’s warranty.
Therefore, if it could be shown that either screening or signaling mechanisms were available to shareholders ex ante (i.e.,
before hiring a manager) to separate good and bad managers,
assuming away adverse selection issues would be justifiable.
This is because in this case, the shareholders’ problem would be
reduced solely to avoid moral hazard by good managers. Alternatively, it could be that incentive compensation is effective to
address both issues of moral hazard and adverse selection. The
ensuing discussion, however, exposes both the lack of ex ante
separating mechanisms to mitigate adverse selection issues in
the shareholder-manager relationship and the limits of using
incentive compensation to the same end. It therefore also exposes an analytical framework that only incorporates the managerial moral hazard problem as incomplete.
1. The Lack of Ex Ante Separating Mechanisms
How realistic is the assumption that ex ante mechanisms
to separate good and bad managers are available to shareholders? If adverse selection was just a problem of incompetence—
the risk of hiring an unskilled or unqualified manager—one
could reasonably argue that signaling mechanisms are available to mitigate the problem. A manager’s educational records,
industry expertise, reputational capital, and networking skills
are all examples of credible signals that a manager can use (or
a firm can acquire and consider) to that end.
As highlighted by the simple illustration above, however, a
manager’s hidden knowledge about her “type” does not just
concern her competence or expertise. It also concerns a manager’s hidden preferences and exclusive knowledge of business
conditions. Designing an incentive-compatible contract for these additional sources of adverse selection is much more prob124. Adverse selection may not just be bad for the principal. When the
principal cannot distinguish between good and bad types, he will pool them
together, with the result being cross-subsidization: good types will receive
worse terms (i.e., pay higher prices or receive lower rewards) than they would
if their type was knowable, whereas bad types will receive far better terms.
See Akerlof, supra note 91, at 491. In response to this problem, good types also
have incentives to separate from bad types through the use of signaling. See
generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973)
(providing a seminal treatment of signaling mechanisms where the better informed take costly actions in the attempt to “signal” their type, such as in the
job market).
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lematic than in the case of managerial competence. For one
125
thing, the “soft” nature of private information about a manager’s preferences or knowledge of the business is likely to reduce the availability of signaling mechanisms. Information
about a manager’s competence—for example, a manager’s educational records—tends to be verifiable by the shareholders
once it is disclosed. Conversely, the nature of a manager’s information about her preferences or knowledge of the business
may be more difficult for outsiders to verify, with the result
that bad types may mimic good types by disclosing the same
unverifiable soft information.
Screening mechanisms are also unlikely to be available for
these additional sources of adverse selection. On the one hand,
the limited liability of the corporate form restricts the set of
available contractual menus shareholders can offer to managers. It does so by preventing shareholders from imposing a negative payoff on the manager for the realization of a bad state of
the world—such as the failure of an excessively risky project or
126
a poor-quality project. Thus, while an insurer can use a deductible to induce the revelation of information concerning a
customer’s risk propensity, shareholders cannot employ a similar screening technology to extract ex ante information on the
manager’s type.
On the other hand, while shareholders could, in theory, resort to a different menu of contracts, their incentives to increase efficiency ex post—over the development of the relationship with the agent—are likely to weaken the efficacy of any
screening technology. This problem, which economists label
127
“limited commitment” (or “time inconsistency”), is not exclu125. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
126. An exception to this assumption arises under the Dodd-Frank Act’s
clawback provision. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4). This provision allows corporations to recover
incentive-based compensation paid to managers if there is a financial restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer with any financial reporting requirements in the three-year period following the incentive’s payment. See id. This circumstance, however, can only capture a very small
portion of bad managers, as it is premised on the assumption that the manager’s private information becomes ex post observable and verifiable by a thirdparty adjudicator. But this is a condition that is likely to be satisfied only in a
small fraction of cases.
127. The seminal economic treatment of the “limited-commitment” problem
in contract theory is Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1153, 1158–59 (1988). The original intui-
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sive to the shareholder-manager context. Rather, it pervades
all “dynamic” agency relationships involving asymmetric information and a temporal lag between the undertaking of the
agent’s actions and the full realization of these actions and
their consequences.
Under these transactional features, a chosen incentive
128
structure will often leave money on the table ex post. This
produces a tension between modifying the initial contract to reduce ex post efficiency losses, and providing the agent with efficient incentives ex ante (i.e., before the agent is hired). Because
a rational agent anticipates that the initial incentives may not
remain binding for the entire course of the relationship, those
incentives become no longer attractive to her in the first place,
which may lead to even greater efficiency losses.
Thus, in the corporate context, a bad manager anticipates
that revealing information on her type by choosing a given contract within a menu will lead the shareholders to subsequently
modify the contract. In particular—and unlike in other contexts
where adverse selection issues may arise, such as the insurance
market—shareholders can be expected to react to the disclosure
of the manager’s bad type by either deciding not to hire the
manager in the first place or firing her. Indeed, contracting
with a bad type (i.e., a high-risk prospective customer) may still
be profitable to an insurer as long as she can set ad hoc contractual terms (i.e., higher insurance premiums). On the contrary, contracting with a bad manager tends to be always unprofitable to shareholders. Therefore, it will generally be
rational for a bad manager to hide her type.
A modification of the above illustration will help to gain
better understanding of the matter. For simplicity, since our
tion, however, is credited to Ronald Coase, who first pointed out (in the famous
Coase Conjecture) that in the absence of credible commitment, a durable-goods
monopolist is unable to extract any rent. See R.H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON. 143, 145–46 (1972). For discussions of the limited
commitment problem in legal scholarship, see Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 231–33 (1997) (arguing that commitment problems provide a
justification for prohibiting contractual modification); Talley, supra note 107,
at 283, 350 (discussing the limited commitment problem that arises in the
corporate opportunities context); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Hands-Tying in Principal-Agent Relationships: Venture Capital Financing,
Publishing Contracts, and Academic Tenure (Dec. 1989) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (examining commitment problems in several contractual contexts).
128. Talley, supra note 107, at 350.

1408

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1377

goal is to show that ex ante separating mechanisms are not
available to mitigate adverse selection issues in the corporate
context, let us assume that the choice of available projects is
limited to the Innovative Project (i.e., the production of an innovative computer) and the Bad Project (i.e., the production of
an obsolete computer). Let us also assume that the menu of
contracts offered by the shareholders to the prospective manager included only two contracts. The first, or “Equity Contract,”
provides for a managerial pay package that includes a high equity-compensation component and a low fixed-salary component. The second contract, or “Salary Contract,” provides for a
low equity-compensation component and a high fixed-salary
component. In principle, this contractual menu should induce a
Good Manager—who will undertake the Innovative Project—to
select the Equity Contract, as she can be expected to be confident about the future success of the innovative computer. Conversely, a Bad Manager—who can only undertake the Bad Project—should be motivated to choose the Salary Contract, as she
will generally anticipate that an obsolete computer will soon
fail to be competitive.
A rational Bad Manager, however, will anticipate that the
shareholders may have incentives to use the private information revealed through her choice of a Salary Contract to subsequently modify that contract, not hiring the manager in the
first place or firing her straight after the disclosure of such in129
formation. As a result, the Bad Manager will also choose the
Equity Contract and the shareholders will be unable to tell
good managers apart from bad ones.
2. The Limits of Incentive Compensation
The prior Section has showed the general lack of ex ante
separating mechanisms—either taking the form of signaling or
screening devices—to address the adverse selection issues that
arise in the shareholder-manager relationship. However, it
could be argued that the incentives shareholders provide managers for the purpose of reducing moral hazard are also effective to mitigate adverse selection. After all, a manager’s preferences or private information on the business only matter for the
shareholders if the manager decides to act on that information
129. See supra note 119 (discussing how the example’s setting can be interpreted as referring to either the moment of a manager’s initial hiring or that of
the subsequent review of a manager’s compensation).
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130

to the shareholders’ detriment. From this perspective, if the
incentives the shareholders provide to managers to avoid moral
hazard could also prevent managers from opportunistically exploiting their hidden knowledge, assuming away adverse selection issues would be justified in practice, if not in theory. As
this Section will explain, however, “bad” managerial types do
not respond to incentives for optimal project selection. Therefore, this Article argues that the crucial limit of incentive compensation is adverse selection, rather than the risk of board
capture, as claimed by shareholder advocates.
The example introduced above is again useful to better illustrate this conclusion. In the example’s context, assuming
that incentive compensation can be used to effectively address
both moral hazard and adverse selection implies that the
shareholders could design an Equity Contract that makes it individually rewarding for the manager both to choose the Innovative Project over the Regular Project, if the manager is Good,
and the Innovative Project over the Bad Project, if the manager
131
is Bad.
Two reasons, however, suggest that this contract will generally be unavailable to shareholders. The first reason concerns
feasibility issues and is provided under standard economic
models of moral hazard and adverse selection. Indeed, in moral
hazard models, shareholders are assumed to know the nature
and monetary value of the private benefits a manager can extract. In adverse selection models, however, they are assumed
132
to lack these pieces of information. This implies that shareholders cannot design an incentive-compatible contract that
can at once address moral hazard and adverse selection, as
they are uncertain about the incentives constraints that such a
contract needs to satisfy.
More concretely, in our illustration, the shareholders could
anticipate the value to a Good Manager of saving the cost of effort and, therefore, be able to design a compensation contract
130. Put differently, if the manager’s action were perfectly observable by
the shareholders, bad managers would not opportunistically exploit their private information, as they would anticipate their behavior to trigger shareholder retribution.
131. Unlike in the example in Part II.C.1, here we do not assume away
moral hazard. It follows that a Good Manager can choose between the Regular
Project and the Innovative Project.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 108–12 (listing the five factors
that principals must anticipate in moral hazard models and the three factors
that principals must anticipate within adverse selection models).

1410

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1377

that rewards the manager for bearing this cost. However, in
order to ensure that the manager’s compensation contract is also effective for a bad type, the shareholders would need information about the nature of the Bad Project and the benefits the
manager derives from it, which they are assumed to lack. Thus,
whether the bad type is driven to the Bad Project because of,
for example, the lack of adequate skills, hubris, or to safeguard
a prior personal relationship will affect the kind of incentives
the shareholders need to provide the manager in order to make
her compensation contract incentive-compatible. Without being
privy to this information, then, the shareholders will be unable
to design such a contract.
The second reason that limits the effectiveness of incentive
compensation to mitigate adverse selection is that even if
shareholders were able to provide managers with the right incentives to avoid acting opportunistically on their hidden
133
knowledge, doing so would be excessively costly to them. Indeed, one could argue that shareholders do not need to have
exact knowledge of a manager’s incentive constraints in order
to design effective incentives. Conversely, it would be sufficient
that shareholders held rational expectations about managerial
behaviors, which they could reasonably infer from publicly
available information. For example, in order to determine the
expected engagement in private benefits extraction of a bad
manager, shareholders could rely on information such as the
kind of industry a firm is in, the nature of the firm’s business,
the technology it employs, its existing projects, and so on. Under these conditions, incentive constraints would no longer be
uncertain, allowing shareholders to write contracts that can induce the manager to behave.
This argument, however, fails to take into account that
contracts based on rational expectations about managerial be134
havior effectively pool good and bad types together. This is
because rational expectations are necessarily based on average
managerial behaviors, implying that, in practice, there will always be “worse” managerial types that misbehave more than
the shareholders anticipate—for example, extracting higher
than expected private benefits.
133. See infra Appendix Section B (illustrating the excessively costly result
more tangibly).
134. If one assumes that managerial competence is a source of adverse selection that can be addressed through screening mechanisms, the resulting
equilibrium would be a semi-pooling.
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Of course, this problem could be solved if the shareholders
designed the contract so that its terms incentivize the worst
possible types. Still, while this incentive design could be socially optimal, it is unlikely to be individually optimal for the
shareholders. In setting managerial incentives, rational shareholders will factor in expectations about managerial behaviors
as well as the distribution of managerial types, and then leave
information rents (i.e., pecuniary incentives) to the manager up
to the point where these rents’ marginal return equals their
marginal cost. At an intuitive level, if the worst type is able to
extract a very high private benefit, but the probability of dealing with her is relatively low, the shareholders are likely to be
better off by accepting the risk of dealing with the worst type
than offering a very high information rent that can induce all
135
agents to behave.
Under this conclusion, adverse selection, rather than board
capture, emerges as the crucial limit of incentive compensation.
As discussed above, shareholder advocates maintain that the
risk of board capture makes designing compensation contracts
136
that satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint impossible.
Underlying this view is the undisputable fact that the corporate role of CEOs and other executives give them the opportunity to influence outside board members. Yet, whether executives exploit this opportunity in the way described by
shareholder advocates is a hypothesis that requires empirical
verification and the empirical evidence gathered to date does
137
not seem to support it.
135. From this perspective, the shareholders’ decision to offer a contract
that is incentive-compatible for only a fraction of managers endogenously determines the level of adverse selection (i.e., the fraction of bad managers who
do not respond to incentives).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 64–67 (discussing how board capture negates the premise of incentive compatibility because principals can
take an adversarial position against agents).
137. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., CEO Pay Redux, 96 TEX. L. REV.
57–60 (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author) (documenting empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the board capture hypothesis); Kevin J.
Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 851–52 (2002); see also
Fama & Jensen, supra note 40, at 315 (arguing that the anecdotal evidence
negates the board-capture theory); Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1171, 1175–76 (2004) (arguing that the board capture theory does not explain
several observations about CEO compensation). Further, it remains unclear
how board capture could play a role in the setting of contracts of executives
hired “from the outside,” i.e., having no prior or current ties to the existing
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What matters most, however, is that even assuming that
the risk of board capture could be eliminated—for example, by
vesting shareholders with direct decision-making power over
managerial compensation, as assumed in our illustration—the
use of incentive compensation would still fail to fully protect
shareholder interests. This is because once one factors in the
problem of adverse selection, in addition to moral hazard, incentive compensation is not a viable means to ensure that
managers will behave.
III. THE MORAL HAZARD-ADVERSE SELECTION
TRADEOFF
Part II has exposed the information structure of the shareholder-manager relationship as being more complex—both in
theory and in practice—than commonly assumed in corporate
law scholarship. This Part argues that this information complexity further increases when one takes into account that
moral hazard and adverse selection are competing problems,
whose solutions expose shareholders to a weightier corporate
governance tradeoff than commonly understood. This tradeoff
arises because trying to control adverse selection ex post—by
strengthening the shareholders’ power to promptly remove bad
managers—may distort the ex ante contractual incentives employed to promote managerial effort.
A. SHAREHOLDER REMOVAL IN THE SHADOW OF ADVERSE
SELECTION
Under the standard information account of the shareholder-manager relationship, the right to remove directors, and
hence, their managers, is described as one of the essential powers at shareholders’ disposal to mitigate the moral hazard prob138
lem. Shareholder advocates, in particular, defend the need for
unconstrained removal—the exercise of removal unencumbered
by the adoption of defensive measures or other obstacles—as
139
necessary for efficient corporate governance. Indeed, only by
board of directors. Shareholder advocates describe board capture as arising
from board members being “connected to executives by bonds of interest, collegiality, or affinity.” Bebchuk et al., supra note 30. Such bonds, however, are
unlikely to be in place in the case of a newly hired CEO. See Murphy, supra
note 137, at 850, 852–54 (documenting empirical evidence on outside hires
that is inconsistent with the board capture hypothesis).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.
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ensuring that shareholders have an unconstrained power to replace directors and managers could the risks of entrenchment
and board capture be kept under control.
As to the shareholders’ ability of taking accurate removal
decisions, the economic assumption is that changes in a firm’s
stock prices provide a sufficient statistic on managerial and directorial performance under the semi-strong form of the Effi140
cient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH). In other words,
because opportunistic managers and captured directors would
be statistically more likely to be associated with low stock prices, shareholders could rely on changes in a firm’s stock prices
for guidance on removal decisions.
While this approach to the shareholders’ removal power is
intuitively straightforward, this Article argues that it nevertheless provides an incomplete account of the function of this power. First, this approach fails to consider adverse selection issues. Second, it stands against standard economic assumptions
about the use of incentive compensation as a helpful means to
mitigate moral hazard. Perhaps more importantly, it also runs
opposite to the widespread adoption of incentive-based managerial compensation schemes we observe in the real corporate
world.
Incorporating these facts into the analysis of the shareholders’ removal power suggests that a neglected—and, yet,
pivotal—function of such a power is to reduce adverse selection
costs. As discussed in Part II, in the corporate context no incentive-compatible mechanisms are available to mitigate the problem of adverse selection ex ante, i.e., before a manager is hired.
This suggests that while the power of removal can offer a complementary remedy against moral hazard, it is likely most helpful as an ex post remedy against the hire of a bad manager. It
does so by enabling shareholders to promptly get rid of a manager should her performance, as impounded in a firm’s stock
price, induce them to believe she is a bad type.
Within this theoretical framework, removal primarily matters to shareholders for reasons different than those defended
by shareholder advocates. Nevertheless, if the issue was only
that removal is likely most helpful to address problems of adverse selection than moral hazard, these advocates would still
have a point in defending shareholders’ newly found ability to
exercise removal virtually at all times.
140. See supra note 71.
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This conclusion, however, no longer holds true once the
complexity of the information problems imbuing the shareholder-manager relationship is considered in full. Indeed, this complexity, as shown in the next Section, challenges the shareholders’ ability to exercise removal effectively, raising costs that
may exceed the expected benefits of removal.
B. UNINFORMATIVE MARKET PRICES
Shareholder advocates assume that a firm’s stock price
provides a sufficient statistic on managerial performance and
hence guidance for accurate removal decisions. What these advocates do not consider, however, is that this assumption
weakens to the extent a manager invests in a specific long-term
project where there is a lag between the time the investment is
made and when its value is realized. Classic examples of these
projects include investments in innovation and other intangible
“knowledge” assets, such as ideas, patents, brands, software,
141
copyrights, and the like. Importantly, these investments have
become a defining feature in modern corporate production, as
today’s corporations derive most of their value from the ability
to access, transfer and assemble specific “knowledge,” rather
than from tangible assets (such as land, machines, raw materi142
als, buildings, and the like). Thus, while it may be tempting
to downplay the importance of specific long-term investments
as only affecting the “usual suspects”—companies such as
Google, Facebook, Apple, Tesla, and the like—a recent study
documents that 80% of the market value of U.S. corporations is
143
nowadays represented by intangible assets.
The shift from tangible to intangible investments has fundamental implications for asset pricing efficiency. Tangible assets are visible, meaning that the quality of a firm’s investment
in a new plant or the purchase of land to build new headquarters can generally be capitalized on a corporation’s balance
sheet and, therefore, observed by investors as hard (i.e., verifiable) information. On the contrary, investments in intangibles
tend to mostly involve “soft” information, which are difficult for
141. For a more concrete exemplification, recall the Innovative Project from
the illustration in Part II.A.
142. See BIG INNOVATION CTR., THE PURPOSEFUL COMPANY–INTERIM REPORT, 5, 14 (2016), http://www.biginnovationcentre.com/media/uploads/pdf/
The%20Purposeful%20Company%20Interim%20Report.pdf.
143. See Colin Mayer, Reinventing the Corporation, 4 J. BRITISH ACAD. 53,
54 (2016).
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outsiders to verify even if disclosed to them. Meanwhile, channeling resources to such investments typically demand large
capital expenditures up-front and thus tend to decrease shortterm earnings, which is a type of hard information that the
144
current stock price can more easily incorporate.
Under these transactional features, the shareholder advocates’ assumption that short-term and long-term changes in
145
value tend to be positively correlated may no longer hold
true. On the contrary, prices may fail to fully capture the implications of a firm’s specific long-term investment until those implications begin to show up in cash flows over time, being there146
fore largely uninformative in the short term.
The possibility of uninformative short-term market prices
challenges the assumption that shareholders can exercise the
power of removal efficiently by relying on market prices information. Two basic economic facts support this conclusion. First,
bad types are statistically more likely to be associated with a
147
disappointing firm outcome (i.e., low earnings). Second, the
short-term inability of good managers to support communication about the quality of a specific long-term investment with
hard information makes it especially difficult for good types to
send credible signals to shareholders. As a result, shareholders
may rationally, but inefficiently, respond to the short-term fall
144. See Edmans et al., supra note 23.
145. See Bebchuk, supra note 92, at 1663.
146. More technically, uninformative short-term prices are “nonmonotonic”
in the sense that they do not follow a consistent informational pattern due to
the information asymmetry problems existing between shareholders and managers. The economic mechanisms explaining such inconsistency hinges on
Bayesian updating, which identifies the process through which rational investors update their beliefs about firm value. See Paul R. Milgrom, Good News
and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, 12 BELL J. ECON.
380 (1981). It is also worth emphasizing that the possibility of uninformative
prices does not require discarding the semi-strong version of the ECMH hypothesis. Because the root cause of uninformative prices lies in the insiders’
private knowledge of business conditions, assuming that market contracting
accurately reflects all available public information does not change the conclusion that the market may fail to perceive actions that are expected to be positive in the long term as positive in the short term.
147. Managers who engage in moral hazard are also statistically more likely to be associated with low stock prices. However, under the assumption that
incentive compensation helps mitigate the problem of managerial moral hazard, it is more likely that a low stock price might be interpreted as signaling a
bad type, rather than a good but opportunistic one. In any event, whether
shareholders interpret a low firm outcome as signaling a bad type or an opportunistic one does not change the conclusion that they will have incentives to
exercise removal upon observing such an outcome.
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in stock price that may follow a specific long-term investment
by exercising their removal power (or even just by threatening
removal in order to force changes to existing firm policies), although that outcome might be the result of uninformative shortterm prices rather than the reflection of a manager’s bad type.
C. STRATEGIC SIGNALING
The potential for inaccurate removal decisions by shareholders raises substantial costs. These costs are not limited to
the expected loss of value caused by the mistaken removal of a
good manager or the pressure for inefficient changes in a firm’s
investment policy. More significantly, in the struggle to achieve
separation and avoid removal, good managers may develop a
preference for strategic signaling: undertaking projects that are
expected to improve the shareholders’ perception of their type
148
even if this comes at the expense of optimal project selection.
On the one hand, managers may be induced to pass up profitable specific long-term projects, as these projects are more likely
to result in “early failure,” i.e., trigger a short-term decline in
stock prices. On the other, they may prefer short-termist strategies, which yield high short-term returns at the expense of
long-term firm value, as these strategies improve a manager’s
chances at separating from bad types and, hence, avoid remov149
al.

148. See Ayres, supra note 107, at 397–400 (discussing how the existence of
corporations with bad projects and their incentives to mimic the signals sent
by corporations with good projects imposes an externality on the latter, inducing them to engage in inefficient excessive signaling).
149. The theoretical models of managerial myopia that appeared in the
1980s, during the takeover era, pioneered the study of these distortions, making formal connections between an excessive, takeover-driven focus on stockmarket results and the risk of short-termism. These models were pioneered by
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole, and Jeremy Stein. See Jean-Jacques
Laffont & Jean Tirole, Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment,
and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers, 19 RAND J. ECON. 516,
529–31 (1988) (showing formally that if investments are invisible, high investments might be mistaken for low effort and increase the likelihood of a
takeover); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A
Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 656–61 (1989) (modeling suboptimal investment where managers maximize a weighted average of
near-term stock prices and long-run value); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats
and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 62–67 (1988) (showing formally
that managers of a firm threatened by a takeover will sell an underpriced asset). Under the influence of neoclassical economic thinking, however, mainstream corporate legal theory barely took notice of myopia studies, at least until the 2007–08 financial crisis. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
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This analysis reveals the existence of a basic corporate
governance trade-off between addressing the problems of moral
hazard and adverse selection. This trade-off arises out of the
distortions that the use of the shareholders’ power of removal
to control adverse selection ex post may induce ex ante in the
contractual incentives that should promote managerial effort. If
good managers were not exposed to a higher risk of removal for
the realization of a low short-term outcome, undertaking profitable long-term specific projects would generally be individually efficient for them under the “right” incentive scheme. However, under the risk of false matching by bad types and the
threat of short-term removal, the reward a good manager expects to receive for selecting a specific long-term project is likely to be outweighed by the higher expected risk of removal she
bears under this project. This risk might then induce even a
good manager to become unresponsive to incentives for optimal
project selection, interfering with both shareholder and aggregate welfare maximization.
Our illustration in Part II.A is again useful to discuss these
150
dynamics more concretely. Recall that under the illustration’s
setting there are only three kinds of projects a prospective
manager can undertake: the Regular Project (i.e., the restyling
of a successful computer), the Innovative Project (i.e., the production of an innovative computer) and the Bad Project (i.e.,
the production of an obsolete computer). The illustration also
poses that only a Bad Manager can undertake a Bad Project,
with Bad Managers representing 20% of the overall managerial
population.
Assume now that, consistent with the riskier nature of the
Innovative Projects, in the short-term this project delivers a
payoff of 100 with a probability of 80% and zero otherwise,
while the safer Regular Project delivers a payoff of 100 with
certainty. Recall, however, that the Innovative Project is more
151
valuable than the Regular Project over time. The Bad Project,
The Eclipse of the Shareholder Paradigm 56–57 (Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
150. This modification of the illustration introduced in Part II focuses on
the effects of adverse selection on managerial incentives. This Article’s Appendix provides a more rigorous treatment where the problem of moral hazard
and adverse selection are considered simultaneously. See infra Appendix Section C. It is also worth emphasizing that the illustration’s results are robust to
changes in numerical parameters.
151. The assumption here is that the expected long-term returns from the
Innovative Project more than compensate for the lower expected returns this
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on the other hand, delivers a short-term payoff of 100 with only
a 10% probability, while also being the least profitable in the
long term. Further assume that the shareholders have written
the manager’s compensation contract so to provide a prospective Good Manager with the right pecuniary incentives to prefer the Innovative Project to the Regular Project. Finally assume that—as advocated by the supporters of shareholder
primacy and as it is increasingly the case in the current corporate scenario with empowered shareholders—the shareholders
in our illustration are granted an unconstrained power of removal, so that they can promptly remove the manager if they
deem the manager to be Bad.
Against this setting, let us consider the case where the
shareholders observe a zero payoff in the short term, which can
either come from the undertaking of the Innovative Project or
the Bad Project. The shareholders will then have to decide
whether to retain the manager or remove her depending on
their inference about the manager’s type. In the jargon of game
theorists, the process through which shareholders form this inference is called “updating beliefs” and works as follows. Before
observing the payoff from the short term, the shareholders will
have a given “prior” on the probability that they might be dealing with a good or bad manager. This prior coincides with the
distribution of types: in our illustration, the shareholders thus
believe they might hire a Good Manager with an 80% probability and a Bad Manager with a 20% probability. After observing
the payoff from the short term, however, the shareholders will
form a new (or updated) belief—referred to as “posterior”—on
the probability they might be dealing with a Good or Bad Manager. Specifically, rational shareholders will determine their
152
under which
posterior pursuant to the Bayes’ Rule,
Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 100] is equal to:

Upon observing a zero payoff in the short term, the shareholders will thus believe to be dealing with a Good Manager
with a probability equal to (0.8×0.2)/[(0.8×0.2)+(0.2×0.9)]=

project delivers in the short-term. See infra Appendix Figure 1 (summarizing
the characteristics of each project).
152. See MORRIS H. DEGROOT, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS 11–12
(Wiley Classics Library 2004) (1970).
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47.1%. Accordingly, as the probability they might be dealing
with a Bad Manager is higher than the probability they might
be dealing with a Good one, the shareholders will rationally decide that removal is the right action to take.
A Good Manager, however, will anticipate the shareholders’ future beliefs, adjusting her behavior accordingly. In particular, the manager understands that she will continue to be
employed only if the shareholders observe a short-term payoff
of 100 (i.e., a high short-term firm outcome). This will occur
with probability 80% when the manager chooses the Innovative
Project; conversely, it will occur with certainty if she chooses
the Regular Project, which involves a more standardized, and
hence safer, investment. In other words, a Good Manager is
aware that selecting the Regular Project increases the shortterm likelihood that the shareholders will believe she is a good
type and, therefore, her chances to avoid removal. Indeed,
when the shareholders observe a short-term payoff of 100, their
posterior on the probability that the manager is Good under the
Bayes’ Rule becomes: (0.8×1)/[(0.8×1)+(0.2 0.1)]=97.6%.
Under similar circumstances, as shown more analytically
153
in this Article’s Appendix, the preference a Good Manager
develops for strategic signaling will make the pursuing of the
Innovative Project no longer profitable to the manager even
under the “right” pecuniary incentives. This is because under
the threat of short-term removal by the shareholders, the higher expected loss the manager bears for the risk of losing future
payoffs under the Innovative Project outweighs her expected
reward for undertaking that project. Hence, choosing the Regular Project—engaging in strategic signaling—is a Good Manager’s best response when she is exposed to the threat of shortterm removal by the shareholders.
IV. TOWARD A NEW CORPORATE MODEL
Part III has discussed the positive implications arising
from the coexistence of moral hazard and adverse selection issues in the shareholder-manager relationship, showing that the
competing nature of these problems exposes shareholders to a
fundamental—and
yet
largely
overlooked—governance
tradeoff.

153. See infra Appendix Section C.
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This Part turns to analyzing the normative implications of
this tradeoff. Section A shows that a regime of “time154
consistent” removal decisions, under which the shareholders’
power of removal is delayed to the longer term, facilitates the
moral hazard-adverse selection tradeoff. It does so by ensuring
that removal decisions are constrained to a time when market
prices are more likely to accurately gauge information on managerial types and the fundamental value of a firm’s investment
choices.
Sections B and C explain why both the shareholder primacy model and the board primacy model are inconsistent with
the above theoretical result.
Last, Section D demonstrates that a competing corporate
model with virtually exclusive board authority in the short
term and enhanced shareholder rights in the longer term is
better suited to implement a time-consistent removal regime. A
board protected from shareholder pressure is more likely to be
biased toward tolerating the occurrence of disappointing firm
outcomes. Hence, a biased, insulated board can be expected to
reduce the risk that imperfectly informed shareholders might
inefficiently remove a good manager upon what may appear to
them as an early failure. From this perspective, in the short
term a board’s bias provides a beneficial commitment device to
the longer-term evaluation of managerial decisions. Over time,
however, a board’s bias might grow excessive, while market
prices can be expected to provide shareholders with a more accurate informational focal point. Therefore, in the long run
board authority should be relaxed in favor of granting shareholders stronger governance rights, including an unconstrained
power of removal.
A. TIME-CONSISTENT REMOVAL DECISIONS
Under the incorporation of adverse selection into the analysis of the shareholder-manager relationship, trying to control
the problem of bad managers by strengthening the shareholders’ power of removal—so to allow shareholders to exercise such
power potentially at any time—may impair the shareholders’
ability to successfully incentivize managerial effort. Yet, in
light of the lack of ex ante separating mechanisms and the limits of incentive compensation, removal remains the only means
available to shareholders to lower the cost of hiring a bad man154. See supra text accompanying note 127.
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ager. Economically, this points to the need of finding an “interior solution,” under which mitigating one information problem
155
does not occur at the expense of exacerbating the other.
It is rather intuitive to see why a governance model that
provides for a “time-consistent removal” regime offers this solution. Under this regime, shareholders would commit to the
longer-term evaluation of directorial and managerial actions
and, more generally, to avoid using the threat of removal to in156
terfere with incumbent actions in the short term. This would
ensure that removal decisions are taken by shareholders when
market prices can be expected to more accurately reflect information on the fundamental value of a firm’s investment choices, thereby reducing the risk of inefficient removal of good
managers and, hence, strategic signaling.
Football fans should easily grasp the intuition here. A football coach will have a better inference of her team’s strengths
and weaknesses as the football season proceeds and the number of games increases. Thus, completely reorganizing a team
simply because it loses the first one or two games of the season
would be a poor decision on her part. Doing so when the rest of
the season progresses poorly, however, becomes the rational
decision to make. Similarly shareholders will be better positioned to evaluate managerial decisions (and, hence, managerial types), as the value implications of those decisions begin to
materialize in streams of cash flows over time. As a result, the
benefit removal offers against adverse selection will be less
likely to come at the expense of the introduction of distortions
in the incentives designed to promote managerial effort.
If this conclusion is correct—that a time-consistent removal regime facilitates the moral hazard-adverse selection
tradeoff—we would expect that a Good Manager’s incentives to
undertake the Innovative Project are better preserved when the
shareholders in our illustration are required to wait until after
the short term to decide on managerial removal. To test this
conjecture, let us modify our setting so to introduce an intermediate realization between the short term and the long
term—the medium term. Since our illustration poses that the
company is eventually liquidated in the long term, adding this
155. See MICHAEL CARTER, FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
502 (2001) (defining an interior solution as an interior point of the feasible set
of solutions to an optimization problem).
156. For examples regarding time-consistent removal, see infra Appendix
Section D.
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intermediate realization allows us to explore the welfare implications of delaying the exercise of the shareholders’ power of
removal over the longer term but, of course, before the company
is liquidated.
For simplicity, let us also assume that the structure of the
medium-term payoffs is identical to that of the short-term payoffs for each of the available projects. Hence, in both the short
term and the medium term, the Innovative Project delivers a
payoff of 100 with probability 80% and zero otherwise, the Regular Project delivers a payoff of 100 with certainty, and the Bad
Project delivers a payoff of 100 with a 10% probability. However, as above, in the long term, the Innovative Project is more
profitable than the Regular Project, while the Bad Project is the
least profitable project. The distribution of types also remains
the same, with Bad Managers representing 20% of the overall
managerial population.
As above, the shareholders will then have to decide whether to retain the manager or remove her depending on their inference about the manager’s type. Here, however, the shareholders will have to wait until the end of the medium term
before being able to make such a decision. Analytically, this
implies that the shareholders will apply the Bayes’ Rule sequentially in order to update their belief on the manager’s type,
factoring in the observation of a stream of payoffs (i.e., the
short-term realization plus the medium-term realization) as
157
well as the observation of these payoffs’ order. For convenience, Figure 1 below summarizes the shareholders’ posteriors
after observing any possible combination of payoffs yielded in
158
the short and medium term.

157. See Milgrom, supra note 146, at 381–82, 385–87.
158. Infra Appendix Section D details the calculations of the shareholders’
posterior for each possible combination of payoffs.
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Figure 1: Medium-Term Posterior Beliefs

Consistent with this Article’s theoretical predictions, Figure 1 shows that the shareholders gain a much better inference
about the likelihood that a manager be Good or Bad when they
are required to wait until the medium term before deciding on
managerial removal. Recall that with the observation of only a
zero short-term payoff, the shareholders believed the manager
159
to be Good with a 47.1% probability. When the shareholders
can rely on two consecutive payoffs, instead, their posterior becomes much more accurate. On the one hand, if the shareholders observe two consecutive zero payoffs, they can be considerably more confident that the manager is Bad, as there is only a
16.5% probability that the manager might be Good under these
realizations. Conversely, if the shareholders observe a short160
term payoff of zero and then a payoff of 100, they can be rather confident that the manager is Good, as this probability increases to 87.7% under these alternative realizations.
The explanation behind these results is rather straightforward. In the short term, in light of the possibility of uninformative market prices, a Good Manager pursuing an Innovative
Project and a Bad Manager may both end up with zero returns
so that a Bad Manager can easily mimic a Good one. However,
in the medium term, when the implications of managerial
choices can be expected to be more accurately impounded in
firm outcomes, a Bad Manager is much more likely than a Good
159. See supra text accompanying note 152 (using Bayes’ Rule to determine
that the Manager would be Good with a probability of 47.1%).
160. The case where the shareholders observe a short-term payoff of 100,
whether followed by another payoff of 100 or a zero payoff in the mediumterm, does not pose a problem as per the discussion in Part III.C.
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Manager to deliver two consecutive zero payoffs, with the result
that false matching becomes a more remote possibility. This
means, in practice, that the risk that the shareholders may
mistakenly fire a Good Manager (or, likewise, mistakenly retain a Bad Manager) is considerably reduced under a timeconsistent removal regime. As a result—as illustrated more analytically in this Article’s Appendix Section D—Good Managers
161
will have fewer incentives for strategic signaling.
B. THE LIMITS OF SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT
This Article’s analysis of the information problems imbuing
the shareholder-manager relationship, and these problems’
normative implications, bears critical challenges for the advocates of shareholder primacy.
As a theoretical matter, this analysis exposes the problem
of short-termism that arises from strengthening the shareholders’ power of removal (and, more generally, from increasing
shareholders’ governance rights) to be much more pervasive
than recognized by shareholder advocates. Indeed, shorttermism is not just the result of the pressure of some shareholders with excessive discounting preferences. It is, instead,
the ultimate consequence of a causal chain that starts with adverse selection and asset pricing inefficiencies—that is, market
imperfections that affect all shareholders as a matter of course.
Further, as a practical matter, the changes that have occurred in corporate governance in the past fifteen years—from
the rise of hedge funds to the decline in the use and effective162
ness of defensive measures —suggest that the problem of
short-termism might be as severe as ever today. Indeed, the increased ability shareholders have acquired to throw incumbents out of office at any time, combined with the increased
growing importance of intangible assets and private managerial information, make it more likely that today’s managers may
develop short-termist incentives. Recent evidence that U.S.
corporations are increasingly curbing long-term investments in
favor of short-term “liquidity events,” such as more frequent
163
dividend payouts and stock buybacks, is thus hardly surprising, although not less troubling.

161. See infra Appendix Section D.
162. See supra Part I.B (exploring the timeline of the rise of empowered
shareholders from the late 1970s until today).
163. Since the 1990s, for example, U.S. nonfinancial corporations have dis-
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Nonetheless, a shareholder advocate could respond that
this Article’s conclusion about the inefficiency engendered by
the increased shareholders’ ability to promptly remove managers (or otherwise exert pressure on incumbents) does not necessarily make the shareholder primacy model less desirable than
the traditional board primacy model.
This argument would go as follows. First, this Article’s discussion of the information problems imbuing the shareholdermanager relationship does not challenge the argument that
shareholders should enjoy an effective power of removal. Rather it defends the merits of time-consistent removal decisions
against the inefficiency of short-term removal decisions. Second, this Article’s analysis has so far largely proceeded on the
classic principal-agent model assumption that the shareholdermanager relationship can be represented as a bilateral relationship, therefore abstracting from the role of the board of di164
rectors. Once this role is factored in, however, it might create
complexities for the exercise of time-consistent removal decisions, unless shareholder authority over the corporate affairs
has teeth.
As explained in Part I, under the traditional board-centric
model, decisions on managerial termination belong to the
board, although shareholders are granted the right to remove
board members and, then, also incumbent managers. This
means, in practice, that if the shareholders’ right to remove
board members is not effective—as shareholders advocates argue is the case when the board can adopt defensive measures or
is otherwise protected by shareholder pressure—the board will

gorged $50 to $200 billion more in cash annually to shareholders through repurchase programs than they have raised through the issue of new shares. See
Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
685, 718–19 (2015). Standard & Poor’s also recently reported that dividends
and stock buybacks in the United States totaled a record of more than $900
billion in 2014. See Martin Lipton et al., Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2016, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 9,
2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/09/some-thoughts-for-boards-of
-directors-in-2016. Similarly, a study from the Roosevelt Institute reported
that “between the second half of 2009 through 2013, corporations borrowed
nearly $900 billion, but paid out $740 billion to shareholders, while investing
only $400 billion.” John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door:
The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance 59–60 (Columbia Law Sch., Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 521, 2015), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2656325.
164. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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hold exclusive decision-making power over managerial removal
decisions. According to shareholder advocates, this poses a major risk for efficient corporate governance, as potentially captured boards could not be trusted when it comes to evaluating
165
managerial accountability. Therefore, a shareholder advocate
would conclude that a shareholder primacy model should still
be preferred to a board-centric model, although plausibly conceding that this model would need to be modified so to ensure
that shareholders commit to the longer-term evaluation of directorial and managerial decisions. Under this modified version
of shareholder primacy, shareholders would still retain an effective power of removal that cannot be trumped by board authority, but commit to exercise that power only in the longer
term.
Although this Article shares the premises of this argument—about preserving the effectiveness of the shareholders’
removal power and incorporating the role of the board of directors—it submits that such an argument neglects to consider a
crucial factor: the inability of shareholders to credibly commit
to a time-consistent removal regime. As discussed earlier, a
limited commitment problem is the result of the tension that
arises in any dynamic relationship involving asymmetric information and a temporal lag between the undertaking of the
166
agent’s actions and the full realization of those actions. In
this information environment, parties have incentives to eliminate the efficiency losses that may arise ex post over the development of the relationship. Yet, acting in this way may undermine initial, ex ante attempts at implementing efficient
transactional structures, ultimately leading to even greater efficiency losses.
In the corporate context, rational shareholders can be expected to ex ante understand that a commitment to the longerterm evaluation of directorial and managerial actions serves
their interest, as it facilitates the moral hazard-adverse selection tradeoff. However, ex post—that is, upon observing a disappointing short-term outcome—they are unable to remain
faithful to that commitment. Because bad managers are more
likely to be associated with disappointing firm outcomes and
good managers tend to be unable to send signals supported by
165. See supra text accompanying notes 53–55 (discussing shareholder advocates’ concerns about the accountability of boards and their ability to further
shareholder interests).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 127–30.
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hard (i.e., verifiable) information in the short-term, shareholders will rationally believe there is a high probability that the
manager is bad (and the board is captured) upon observing a
167
short-term low stock price. As a result, in the attempt to limit
the efficiency losses engendered by adverse selection, shareholders will make the rational decision of removing incumbents. And herein lies the problem: anticipating that the
shareholders’ commitment to time-consistent removal decisions
is not binding in case of early failure and that specific longterm projects are more likely to trigger such failure, managers
will engage in strategic signaling, causing shareholders even
168
greater efficiency losses.
Examined against the shareholders’ limited commitment
problem, the search for a governance model that can facilitate
time-consistent removal decisions moves in a different direction. As explained next, this direction starts with a novel understanding of the role served by the board of directors, which
neither coincides with the vicious board depicted by shareholder advocates, nor the virtuous one defended by board advocates.
C. VIRTUES AND VICES OF BIASED BOARDS
Shareholder advocates see board capture as the major obstacle to effective managerial accountability and hence claim
that enhancing the shareholders’ power of removal is necessary
to ensure this accountability. On the polar opposite side, board
advocates defend board authority as necessary to preserve the
board’s informational advantage about private managerial in-

167. See infra Appendix Section C (analyzing strategic signally of managers); see also Fama, supra note 71.
168. Nevertheless, it could still be argued that while a market-driven
shareholders’ commitment to time-consistent removal decisions is not credible,
a formal contractual commitment would be credible. Yet, this solution is unlikely to be feasible, as it would require all of a firm’s shareholders to contractually undertake not to exercise removal until the long term. Otherwise, the
ability of just one shareholder to exercise its removal power in the short term
would make the other shareholders’ “commitment contract” useless to reduce
the likelihood of strategic signaling. Multilateral bargaining of this kind, however, seems unlikely to succeed in the context of the well-known collective action problems affecting shareholders. It could be further argued, however, that
under current patterns of increased ownership re-concentration, in some cases
the number of investors might be relatively low, which would facilitate cooperative investor behavior. Yet, even assuming that a firm’s existing shareholders
could successfully agree to a commitment contract, this would not solve the
problem of future shareholders, which should also be necessarily bound by
such a contract.
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formation and, thereby, reduce the risk of short-termism. Thus,
under this Article’s terms, if shareholder advocates conceive of
board authority as the major source of the risk that a bad manager may not be removed when it would be efficient doing so,
board advocates defend the board as being better positioned to
avoid the mistaken removal of a good manager.
As discussed earlier, however, shareholder advocates claim
that in today’s corporate environment—where boards have
come to include a large majority of independent directors and
investors have gained increased sophistication—the argument
of the board’s informational advantage about private manage169
rial information has lost much of its force. This Article recognizes that this claim cannot be dismissed as unfounded. At the
same time, however, this claim should not be held universally
valid, as one cannot radically exclude that the insider position
of board members may give them an informational advantage
over outside investors. More importantly, even assuming that
the board had no informational advantage at all, this Article
defends a stronger reason for expecting a board to be less likely
to mistakenly remove a good manager. This reason is the bias a
board of directors is likely to have toward retaining incumbent
management.
A board’s bias toward incumbent managers can be thought
of as stemming from the very same reasons that, according to
shareholder advocates, promote board capture: the bonds of interest, collegiality and affinity that are likely to develop over
time between managers and board members. These advocates
draw drastic consequences from these bonds, suggesting that
capture would make directors largely subservient to manage170
ment and incapable of providing efficient incentives. This Ar171
ticle, as discussed earlier, rejects this claim. Nevertheless, it
recognizes that the existence of these bonds might induce a
board to be more tolerant than outside investors in evaluating
managerial performance. Current board appointment rules
emphasizing independency requirements are likely to add to a
board’s bias, as the time constraints and expertise limitations
affecting the participation of independent directors can be ex-

169. See supra text accompanying notes 99–05.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 53–55 (discussing the shareholder
concerns about board capture).
171. See supra Part II.C.2. (discussing how the claim of board capture
seems to be both theoretically and empirically unfounded).
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pected to play in favor of a greater deference to incumbent
management.
Given the likelihood that a board might be biased in favor
of incumbent managers, when the removal decision exclusively
belongs to the board—as it occurs, in practice, when the board
is protected from removal through the adoption of defensive
measures—it will be less likely that a disappointing short-term
172
firm outcome may trigger managerial removal. A further
modification of the illustration introduced in Part II.A is useful
to show this conclusion more analytically. To this end, let us
modify the illustration’s assumptions so as to pose that the
board of directors, rather than the shareholders, holds decisionmaking power over managerial removal. Let us also introduce a
measure of bias, β, which is designed to capture the distortion
from the perfect Bayesian updating that one can expect to see
when the removal decision is exclusively delegated to the
173
board. Under this bias, the board can be assumed to assess
its posterior based on the observed payoff realization only with
probability 1–β, meaning that with probability β the board will
believe the manager to be Good even upon the realization of a
disappointing firm outcome.
Under these assumptions, and posing, as above, that the
board observes a zero payoff at the end of the short term, the
board will consider the manager to be Good with probability
β×1+(1–β)×0.471, where 0.471 (i.e., 47.1%) is the likelihood that
the shareholders would believe a manager to be Good under the
174
Now, posing that the board is only
same circumstances.
slightly biased, so that it can be assumed that β=0.2, this implies that the board will consider the manager to be Good with
a probability of 57.7%. Therefore, because the board’s posterior
suggests that the manager is more likely to be Good than Bad,
the board will arguably not remove the manager—as the
shareholders would, instead, most likely do under the same circumstances (given the lower 47.1% probability with which they
would hold the manager to be Good).
However, while this Article shares the board advocates’
claim that the board of directors is better positioned than
shareholders to avoid the mistaken removal of a good manager,
172. Note that whether a board is biased in good or bad faith does not
change the conclusion that a board is less likely than shareholders to remove a
manager upon a low short-term outcome.
173. See supra Part III.C.
174. For more mathematical explanations, see infra Appendix Section E.
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it does not share the conclusion that this makes a governance
model with perpetually exclusive board authority normatively
desirable. The rationale for rejecting this conclusion is that a
board’s bias toward incumbent management might grow excessive in the longer term. Indeed, the same reasons that make a
board less likely to remove a good manager in the short term
may produce countervailing effects in the longer term, making
a board similarly less likely to efficiently remove a bad manager. In other words, as shown in this Article’s Appendix Section
E, a board could fail to remove a manager even after observing
two consecutive zero payoffs at the end of the medium term,
when removing the manager would be the efficient decision to
175
make.
D. STRONG BOARDS, STRONG SHAREHOLDERS
The discussion in Parts IV.A and IV.B above has exposed
the limits of both the shareholder primacy model and the board
primacy model in implementing a regime of time-consistent
removal decisions. Shareholder primacy, on the one hand, fails
to address the limited commitment problem that affects shareholders. It is therefore incapable of avoiding the risk of inefficient removal of good managers and, hence, the risk of strategic
managerial signaling—raising serious short-termist concerns.
Board primacy, on the other hand, reduces these concerns, but
fails to ensure the efficient removal of bad managers—failing to
mitigate adverse selection issues.
Against this analytical background, this Article argues on
behalf of a competing governance model with stronger board
authority in the short term and enhanced shareholder governance rights—including an unconstrained power of removal—in
the longer term.
In the short term, stronger board authority—such as the
authority a board is likely to gain through the adoption of defensive measures—ensures that a board retains exclusive decision-making power over managerial removal decision. This
means that the board can be assumed to exercise its decisionmaking power without being exposed to shareholder retribution
for making what may be perceived as a “wrong” decision or otherwise being subject to shareholder pressure. Under these circumstances, as explained above, a board of directors will likely
175. See infra Appendix Section E (comparing different outcomes between
beneficial and excessive board biases).
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exhibit a bias toward tolerating the occurrence of disappointing
firm outcomes. In contrast to what is argued by shareholders
advocates, this bias can be expected to serve a positive function
in light of the moral hazard-adverse selection tradeoff and the
shareholders’ limited commitment problem. It does so by
providing a commitment device against the likelihood of inefficient short-term removal decisions by the shareholders, offering
an institutional remedy to the shareholders’ inability to credibly commit to the longer-term evaluation of managerial actions
176
and types.
In this sense, a “biased board” that is protected by shortterm market pressure provides shareholders with what philos177
opher Jon Elster refers to as a “form of rationality over time.”
As explained by Elster, in situations where an individual anticipates that she will choose an undesirable future course of action unless prevented from doing so, it may be in the individual’s interest to adopt precautionary measures that limit her
ability to make that choice in the future, or at least make that
178
choice less likely. In the same way, granting the board of directors exclusive short-term authority over managerial removal
decisions allows shareholders to achieve more than they could
otherwise achieve if they were free to exercise their removal
power at any time.
In the longer term, however, on the one hand, a board’s bias might grow excessive, meaning that a biased, insulated
board is more likely to inefficiently avoid removing a bad manager. On the other hand, market prices are more likely to provide reliable guidance for the efficient exercise of the share179
Therefore, a board’s exclusive
holders’ removal power.
176. Corporations with a controlling shareholder represent an important
exception. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 27, at 125. In general, controlling
shareholders can more accurately assess managerial performance, as they
tend to have better access to information, partly because they often hold board
seats (directly or through a representative). See id. Further, controlling shareholders are also more likely to be subject to reputational sanctions if they default on a prior commitment, especially if they serve as a firm’s directors. See
id. This suggests the use of dual-class stock might be a viable alternative to
the use of defensive measures to protect a firm’s commitment to long-term
value creation. See Zoran Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 565–67, 576–86 (2016) (claiming that
entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them to pursue longterm business visions).
177. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 5 (2000).
178. See id.
179. See supra Part III.B (discussing the informational limitations of stock
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authority over managerial removal decisions should be relaxed
in favor of greater shareholder authority. In practice, in the
longer term a board should not be insulated from shareholder
pressure nor the shareholders’ removal power be limited by the
adoption of defensive measures or any procedural hurdles.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Part presents the principal policy implications of this
Article’s novel theory of the optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders and suggests directions of
change that should be taken due to these implications. It does
so against the background of the recent changes occurring both
in legal rules and market practices that have contributed to
180
shift corporate power from boards to shareholders. These
changes have rewarded the long-standing efforts of shareholder
advocates to strengthen shareholder governance rights in the
conviction that such a transformation would increase directorial and managerial accountability.
Reexamined through this Article’s analytical perspective,
enhanced shareholder power addresses the risk that boards insulated from shareholder discipline can be inefficiently biased
toward retaining incumbent managers. What shareholder advocates do not consider, however, is that in the short term, a
biased, insulated board serves the very interests of shareholders, as it puts in place a commitment to time-consistent removal decisions that shareholders themselves are unable to provide
due to their limited commitment problem.
Because of the gains made by shareholder advocates, however, today’s boards have grown less able to gain protection
from short-term shareholder pressure. Most notably, defensive
measures such as staggered boards and poison pills have become less effective in the current corporate landscape of increased shareholder activism, as activists have gained the ability to coerce boards to approve the dismissal of such defenses or
181
otherwise sneak past these protections. The result, as outlined earlier, is that U.S. corporations are worryingly moving
182
toward short-termist shareholder gains. This is consistent
with this Article’s theoretical prediction that the ultimate cost
prices in the short term).
180. See supra Part I.B.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 84–90.
182. See supra note 163.
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of an indiscriminate extension of shareholder rights is inefficient project selection at the equilibrium, which may present a
183
systematic threat to sustainable firm growth. To remedy this
status of affairs, this Part outline measures designed to reempower boards to limit short-term shareholder interference in
managerial accountability decisions and, more generally, the
corporate affairs.
On the other hand, what is missing from current defenses
of board authority by board advocates is the recognition that
exclusive board authority might become detrimental to firm
and shareholder interests in the longer term, as a board’s bias
184
might grow excessive. In response, this Part also argues that
defensive measures should have a “finite” rather than a “perpetual” life. This means that such measures should be designed
so to automatically expire as a corporation’s business cycle
transitions from the short to the long term, unless the board is
able to secure shareholders’ approval for extending the use of
such measures to an additional period of time.
After discussing the directions of change counseled by this
Article’s novel theory of board and shareholder power, this Part
concludes with an assessment of the means through which such
changes should be implemented. It does so by exploring the potential for a coordinated private ordering response by U.S.
boards and institutional investors, accompanied by accommodating changes in the Delaware courts’ approach to the use of
board defenses.
A. DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE
1. Short-Term and Long-Term Defined
So far, this Article has not yet defined the line between
short and long term. Indications coming from the real corporate
world suggest that, as a general reference point, the short-term
horizon should correspond to the three-year span following the
appointment of a new CEO—a point in time that can be assumed to coincide with the beginning of a new business cycle.

183. See Part II.
184. Even assuming that a board’s ability to commit a corporation to the
longer-term evaluation of managerial actions rests on the informational advantage, rather than the bias, of directors, one should acknowledge that such
advantage is likely to reduce over time, as market prices can be expected to
more accurately reflect private managerial information.
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Among others, this proposal is consistent with the recommendations that have come from several corporate actors—
including institutional investors—to address the risk of shorttermist activist interventions. Pursuant to such recommendations, the tax code should be amended so to qualify an investment as long term—and, hence, as entitled to benefit from advantageous tax treatments—only if it lasts for a minimum
period of three years, rather than the existing one-year peri185
od. A triennial term also is the common standard for board
186
members serving on a staggered board. Further, if one con187
siders that the average CEO’s tenure is about seven years
188
and the average director tenure is about eight years, identifying the short term with a horizon of three years seems consistent with majoritarian market practices.
There are, however, two caveats to this general indication.
First, the three-year short-term horizon should be interpreted
with some degree of flexibility. In fact, within the parameters
indicated by majoritarian market practices, the determination
of the exact extension of the short-term horizon should be left
to individual firms, in order to avoid that a bright-line rule may
fail to accurately reflect firm-specific circumstances.
Second, the general principle that a board—and hence
management—should be protected by shareholder interference
185. In a letter sent to the CEOs of 500 of the nation’s largest companies in
April 2015, Laurence Fink, the CEO of BlackRock—currently the largest asset
manager in the world, overseeing over four trillion dollars of investments—
expressed concerns for short-termist activist intervention, while also advancing the proposal described in the text as a possible remedy. See Andrew Ross
Sorkin, BlackRock’s Chief, Laurence Fink, Urges Other C.E.O.s To Stop Being
So Nice to Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/04/14/business/dealbook/blackrocks-chief-laurence-fink-urges-other-ceos
-to-stop-being-so-nice-to-investors.html?_r=0. Similar proposals have also
come from academics, international think tanks, institutional investors and
even political circles. See, e.g., ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A
CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS
MANAGEMENT 3 (2009), http://assests.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/
content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf; Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note
163, at 10 (noting that presidential candidate Hillary Clinton advanced a proposal along similar lines); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy To Curb Speculative Short-term Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 101, 109 (1989). These recommendations share the common view that amending the tax code in this way
would introduce a beneficial form of Pigouvian taxation, deterring “hit-andrun” activists.
186. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 27, at 77.
187. See supra note 113.
188. See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Renewed Focus on Corporate
Director Tenure, N.Y.L.J. (May 22, 2014).
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for the first three years of a CEO’s tenure does not imply that
after this initial time span, a board could no longer, for example, adopt any defensive measures, regardless of the duration of
its mandate. This would be inconsistent with the actuality that
the same CEO and board members tend to develop multiple investment cycles during their tenures. After the initial threeyear term, however, a board would need to submit proposals for
extended protection to a binding shareholder vote, substantially giving shareholders a binding “say on corporate govern189
ance.” This mechanism would mitigate the risk that a board
might opportunistically exploit extended protection to camouflage a real failure for a longer-than-expected “early failure.” At
the same time, it would enable a board to benefit from extended
protection if directors can persuade shareholders that such protection serves their interests.
Finally, as to the risk that exclusive board authority in the
short term might prevent shareholders from promptly addressing cases where a manager is patently “bad” or is clearly engaging in moral hazard, such a risk should not be overstated. In190
deed, the remedy of removal for cause and fiduciary rules
would remain available to shareholders to respond to similar
outrageous cases.
2. Higher-Order Constraints and Finite Board Protection
In the political context, constitutional constraints that restrain options available to a polity are often described “as enabling rather than constraining, that is, as devices not only for
limiting government, but also for facilitating the difficult pro191
cess of self-government.” When one applies this view to corporate governance, placing restrictions on the removal of managers in the short-term serves a constructive governance function,
as it avoids that shareholder may rely on uninformative shortterm share prices in deciding whether or not to discipline managers.
189. Granting shareholders a long-term binding say on corporate governance is consistent with recent empirical evidence documenting that “bilateral”
defensive measures that require shareholder approval are associated with increased firm value over time, while defensive measures that can be unilaterally adopted by the board are associated with reduced long-term firm value. See
Cremers et al., supra note 82, at 732–34.
190. See supra note 50.
191. See Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 633, 635, 639–42 (1991) (discussing the benefits of constitutional provisions excluding the right to secede).
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Political theory, however, also points out that commitment
strategies work only as long as they are embedded in further
192
restrictions. For what makes a commitment credible, is the
level of difficulty encountered in reneging on that commitment
193
Thus, without the adoption of higher-level conex post.
straints that can prevent subsequent changes to the “rules of
the game,” first-level constraints risk being exposed to the
same commitment issues that prompted their adoption in their
194
first place. For example, Article V of the U.S. Constitution —
which subject amendments to the Constitution to the approval
of two-thirds of both houses—supplies the means by which con195
stitutional constraints are made meaningful.
In the corporate context, the use of defensive measures
such as staggered boards and poison pills have historically provided the higher-order constraints to safeguard board authority
196
against the threat of short-term shareholder interference
197
With the
and, with it, the board’s commitment function.
emergence of the shareholder empowerment movement, how192. See ELSTER, supra note 177, at 117–18 (explaining that in order to be
effective, “precommitment . . . needs to be protected from interference by the
current majority”).
193. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism:
Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473,
517 (2003).
194. U.S. CONST art. V.
195. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 134–77 (1995) (defending supermajority rules as a means to enable ordinary politics).
196. Until the rise of the hostile takeover in the 1980s, which gave shareholders the ability to remove incumbents through the simple exercise of stock
market purchasing power, the likelihood that shareholders could challenge
board authority was non-existent. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1520–21 (1989). Indeed, under the traditional collective action problems
of dispersed investors and the costs raised by the proxy machinery for challengers before the SEC amendments, shareholders had limited ability to exercise their power of removal even upon the realization of disappointing firm
outcomes. See Cremers et al., supra note 82, at 772–75 (providing empirical
evidence). From this perspective, the introduction of defensive measures can
be thought of as a new form of higher-order constraint that replaced the inherent constraint provided by the absolute insulation of U.S. boards before the
1980s.
197. Other corporate law scholars have explored the idea that the use of
defensive measures may serve as a (pre-)commitment device. These scholars,
however, have restricted their attention to the benefits that defensive
measures may deliver during a takeover context by increasing a board’s bargaining power and thus shareholders’ expected returns. See Kahan & Rock,
supra note 193, at 484 & n.32 (quoting other studies discussing the benefits of
enhanced board power within the takeover context).
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ever, these defenses have grown increasingly less effective as
higher-order constraints. In response, similar to the functions
served by supermajority requirements in the constitutional
context, this Article suggests that a charter provision requiring
the approval of a supermajority—two-thirds or more—of the
shareholders for the dismissal of defensive tactics would be
beneficial. This provision would help restore the effectiveness of
defensive tactics against activist interventions and, with it, the
198
“security of expectations” such measures provide as higherorder constraints protecting a board’s commitment function. On
the other hand, in order not to jeopardize the efficient exercise
of shareholder discipline in the longer term, a board’s defenses
should be designed to have a finite three-year life unless shareholders approve their extension for a subsequent period.
Illustrating how these changes would redefine the way in
which poison pills and staggered boards are designed is useful
to add concreteness to this policy proposal. In the case of poison
pills, a board can unilaterally adopt “on the shelf” (i.e., inactive
but ready to use) pills for use at any time if a threat materializ199
es. This raises concerns that directors might be granted timeinconsistent protection through a pill as a board might use this
defense opportunistically to gain potentially perpetual protection from shareholder discipline. In order to address this risk,
changes should be introduced in the way pills are drafted so to
provide for the adoption of pills with a finite life of three years.
During this period, a pill should be removable only upon
the approval by two-thirds (or more) of the firm’s shareholders
in addition to board’s approval. This would help mitigate the
additional risk that a pill’s protection might be ineffective faced
with the ability acquired by activists to coerce the board’s approval of the dismissal of a pill. After this three-year period, the
pill should automatically expire, unless it is removed earlier
through a supermajority vote or the board is able to secure
shareholder approval to extend the pill’s use for a further period. Unlike in the case of an active pill adopted for longer periods or on the shelf pills without a time limit, this mechanism
would mitigate the risk that a board could opportunistically exploit the pill for undue longer-term protection.
198. Cf. MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE MANY: THE ORIGINS AND
LIMITS OF SUPERMAJORITY RULE 9 (2014) (noting that modern supermajority
rules are primarily regarded as a means to protect a polity’s institutional stability).
199. See Gill et al., supra note 89, at 169–70.
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In the case of a staggered board, the provision of a
supemajority requirement would also ensure that proposals to
destagger the board receive overwhelming approval by the
200
shareholders in addition to receiving board approval. Similar
to the case of poison pills, this feature would be useful to neutralize the increased ability of activists to coerce board approval
to destaggering. Consistent with this theoretical prediction, the
evidence on precatory activist proposals to destagger the board
indicates that while these proposals are generally successful,
they tend to fail when a corporation has adopted a supermajori201
ty requirement for board destaggering.
As to the tools designed to ensure that a staggered board
has a finite rather than perpetual life, some additional clarifications are in order. First, unlike a poison pill, the adoption of a
202
staggered board generally requires shareholder approval.
This is an important difference as it enables shareholders to veto the adoption of a staggered board should they deem this arrangement detrimental to their interest. Second, unlike the potentially perpetual protection provided by a pill, a staggered
board provides each class of directors with protection for a limited period of three years. Third, absent a supermajority requirement and the simultaneous presence of a pill, a staggered
board only delays but does not impede the exercise of voting
203
Considering these specific features of staggered
control.
boards, this Article argues that under the regime it proposes, it
would be sufficient to provide for the automatic expiration of
the supermajority requirement for destaggering, rather than
that of the staggered board itself, after the three-year short204
term period.
200. This proposal would be politically feasible as some U.S. states have
already adopted a similar regime for the removal of staggered boards. See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 8.06(b)–(g) (2016).
201. See generally S’HOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
PROJECT 2012 REPORT (2012), http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/releases/SRP
-2012-Annual-Report.pdf (providing evidence on the precatory proposals filed
by the activist investors that were represented by the Harvard Shareholder
Rights Project).
202. In Delaware, and most other states, shareholder approval is required
to adopt a staggered board after the initial charter or bylaws are in place. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2016). The notable exception is Maryland,
where the board has unilateral power to adopt a staggered board. MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-803 (West 2016).
203. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 58, at 903–04 (discussing the limited
deterrent effect of a staggered board before the pill’s invention).
204. As an alternative to achieve the same result, the current annual elec-
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Further, following the same logic underpinning the proposed introduction of supermajority requirements for the dismissal of board defenses, an additional beneficial measure
would be a corporation’s statutory choice to opt for plurality
voting rather than majority voting in the election of board
members. As discussed earlier, majority voting is one of the
most potent weapons in the arsenal of activists’ governance
205
levers. And activists have increasingly used majority voting
to threaten engaging in withholding campaigns against incumbents in order to obtain desired governance changes including
206
the removal of board defenses. Moving back to a regime of
plurality voting would thus help expropriate activists of this
powerful bargaining lever, correspondingly reinforcing the effectiveness of board defenses as higher-order constraints. Yet,
in order to avoid the risk that moving back to this regime helps
a board to gain perpetual protection, plurality voting should also be designed to have a finite life of three years. This means
that after this period, plurality voting should automatically be
replaced by majority voting unless the board can gain shareholder approval to extend the use of plurality voting to an additional period of time.
B. MEANS OF CHANGE
The above discussion has illustrated the directions and the
tools that would help to transition to a regime of timeconsistent removal decisions. However, it has not addressed the
question of how the proposed changes should be implemented.

tion default of board members could be replaced by a triennial election default.
Such a proposal has been advanced by corporate scholars and shares motivations of time-consistency in the evaluation of managerial actions that are similar to those exposed in this Article. See, e.g., William T. Allen et al., The Great
Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1067, 1073 (2002) (proposing triennial board elections); Martin Lipton
& Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 225–30 (1991)
(proposing quinquennial board elections). Further, pluriennal board terms are
also the norm in several foreign jurisdictions. See Enriques et al., supra note
50, at 61. However, a triennial board term would arguably be less politically
feasible than this Article’s proposal for a supermajority requirement for
destaggering as it would require a modification of state legislation on top of
other hurdles.
205. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common
Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More
Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 11–12 (2007).
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Theoretically, statutory implementation of these changes
could be the most effective solution. In practice, however, the
political hurdles affecting this route make it most likely unfea207
sible. Further, a similar reform intervention could end up
forcing an unnecessary one-size-fits-all approach. This Article
thus submits that a private ordering response, accompanied by
accommodating changes in the Delaware courts’ approach to
the use of board defenses, would be the most feasible route to
improve corporate governance practices.
An immediate objection to this claim is the classic
“Panglossian argument” under which the market is assumed to
208
always move in the direction of efficient outcomes. Thus, if
the governance arrangements this Article advocates really benefitted non-arbitrageur shareholders, one should already observe these arrangements in the real corporate world or, at
least, some attempts at reforming corporate governance practices along those lines.
To the point, it is noteworthy that there have been recent
signs that a demand for recalibrating corporate governance arrangements toward a time-consistent direction seems to be
emerging among heavyweight shareholders such as institutional investors. Breaking old patterns at various times during
2015, major institutional investors issued statements that they
would support the long-term plans of companies against activist attacks, and they would withhold support of activists who
primarily seek to force companies into share buybacks and ex209
traordinary distributions. Institutional investors also seem to

207. For the statutory implementation of this Article’s proposed changes to
be effective, the laws of each state should be consistently amended. Otherwise,
reincorporation into another state could provide an easy way to escape the
new set of rules. Further, in the specific case of Delaware, one should also lobby for mandatory solutions. Otherwise, because Delaware law is structured
such that it mostly provides defaults, corporations could easily opt out of the
new rules. This route would not only be more politically complicated, but also
likely undesirable from a broader efficiency perspective. Last, successfully lobbying Congress to introduce changes at the federal level would be even harder.
208. See Bebchuk, supra note 53, at 888. Panglossian claims, however,
have been criticized as reflecting an overly optimistic view of market achievements. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 728 (2003).
209. See Sorkin, supra note 185 (discussing the short-termist concerns expressed by Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock). Statements of similar tone and
content have also recently come from F. William McNabb III, Chairman and
CEO of Vanguard, another of the biggest players in the institutional investor
landscape, and Anne Simpson, director of corporate governance and a senior
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be following through on their statements about protecting incumbent boards from short-termist activist interventions as
they have begun to vote against these interventions and in fa210
vor of incumbents.
These recent events add concreteness to this Article’s call
for a private ordering solution to reform corporate governance
practices, indicating that such a solution could be cooperatively
carried out by U.S. boards and institutional investors. Importantly, under this solution, this Article’s proposed changes
should be interpreted as exemplificative, rather than exhaustive, as the specific configuration of a corporation’s timeconsistent defenses, the exact determination of both short-term
versus long-term horizons, as well as the mechanisms of finite
duration of a board’s defenses would be ultimately left to these
parties’ contracting. A private ordering response of this kind also seems consistent with the statements soliciting increased cooperation with U.S. CEOs and boards of directors that have
come from institutional investors and prominent corporate
211
lawyers during the past year and a half.
In addition to being politically feasible, this solution would
offer the advantage of empowering market actors with the necessary freedom to devise fine-tuned arrangements that can cater to the specific needs of individual corporations. Nevertheless, it would face two potential challenges. The first is the still
dominant idea in the U.S. legal academy that what needs to be
done to recalibrate the system cannot involve “insulating man212
This view is
agement[] from shareholder accountability.”
largely a product of the vilification of board insulation brought
213
about by shareholder advocates and proxy advisors on the assumption that any form of incumbent protection from removal
is merely a reflection of managerial moral hazard. However, as
portfolio manager of CalPERS, the nation’s largest pension fund by assets. See
Lipton et al., supra note 163.
210. Most notably, in May 2015, Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard
sided with DuPont in its proxy fight against activist hedge fund Trian Fund,
offering the company decisive support. See Justin Lahart, Why Peltz Didn’t
Have Icahn’s Apple Touch, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2015, at B14.
211. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, The New Paradigm for Corporate Governance,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/03/the-new-paradigm-for-corporate
-governance.
212. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 163, at 85.
213. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors?
A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate
Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 450–51 (2014).
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this Article has demonstrated, this assumption is grounded on
a theoretically incomplete account of the information problems
imbuing the shareholder-manager relationship and should thus
be discarded.
The second challenge is whether enhancing the force of
current defensive measures would raise issues under the common law of Delaware as the state where most U.S. corporations
are incorporated. Under the Unocal standards applied by Delaware courts, these measures need to be both reasonable re214
sponses to a cognizable threat and proportional to such a
threat, meaning that the defensive action cannot be “draconian,
215
by being either preclusive or coercive.” Further, if a defensive
tactic has the “primary purpose” of interfering with or imped216
ing the effective exercise of a shareholder vote, it is also re217
quired per Blasius to have a “compelling justification.”
Under Unocal, a first potential problem could be represented by the fact that this Article’s policy proposal conceives of
a board’s defenses more as prospective than as responsive to a
current threat. However, under the broad interpretation that
has been given to Unocal’s reasonableness test, this concern
does not seem particularly severe. First, Delaware courts have
218
in general validated the use of prospective defensive tactics.
Further, as made evident most recently in the 2014 case of
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, the threat of “creeping control”
(or “negative control”)—the ability to exercise disproportionate
influence over major corporate decisions—is sufficient to consti-

214. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del.
1985). This first prong of the Unocal standard “is essentially a process-based
review,” requiring directors to demonstrate that they acted in good faith and
after a reasonable investigation of the threat. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92 (Del. Ch. 2011).
215. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). A defense is coercive if it is “aimed at ‘cramming down’ on [the] shareholders a
management-sponsored alternative.” Id. at 1387. A defense is preclusive when
success in a pending proxy contest is “realistically unattainable.” Selectica,
Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062, at *20 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 26, 2010), aff ’d, 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
216. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
217. Id.
218. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Del. Ch.
1985) (“Directors who have the responsibility for the governance of the corporation are entitled to formulate a takeover policy, whether it be to meet a specific threat or a general prospective one.”).
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tute a cognizable threat justifying the adoption of a defensive
219
measure.
Whether this Article’s proposal for strong but finite defensive tactics could fail Unocal’s proportionality test is more un220
certain. While in principle it should not, in practice one cannot exclude that the specific combination and features of the
defenses a corporation could use might trigger this test. In response, this Article defends a modification of the triggering elements of Unocal’s proportionality test under which the focus of
judicial review should shift to whether a defense is finite or
perpetual. This does not mean that a defense that has been in
place longer than three years (or the alternative period of time
a company might have selected for short-term board protection)
should automatically be found draconian, especially because a
board might have gained shareholders’ consent for extended
protection. It means instead that under this circumstance, the
court should then move to verify whether the defense is either
coercive or preclusive. Conversely, a defense that has been in
place for less than three years (or the alternative period of time
a company might have selected for short-term board protection)
should automatically pass the proportionality test without the
need for a further inquiry into whether the defense is draconian.
Last, Delaware courts are unlikely to evaluate this Article’s proposed changes under Blasius’s “compelling justification” test as its application has been narrowed. In particular, as
made more evident in recent cases involving activist attacks—
which are the focus of this Article’s policy proposal—the courts
clarified that poison pills (i.e., the defense potentially more
likely to trigger the Blasius test) will almost always be assessed

219. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014); see
also supra note 90 (discussing the facts of Third Point). It is also worth emphasizing that the court found the intervention by the activist hedge fund
Third Point to involve creeping control even if the fund held less than 20%
ownership and was not granted any express veto rights. Id.
220. The combined adoption of a staggered board and a supermajority requirement for destaggering, for example, neither contains coercive features
that have an effect on how shareholder votes are cast nor makes the likelihood
of success in a proxy contest “realistically unattainable.” See supra note 215.
Similarly, the adoption of a pill does not by itself trigger the preclusivity
standard, as established by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2010 in Selectica,
2010 WL 703062, at *21.
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under the Unocal standard even when they do impact the
221
shareholder vote.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the persistent debate
over the division of power between boards and shareholders has
been too narrowly framed. For too long that debate has proceeded on the shared assumptions that moral hazard is the information problem to be addressed in the corporate context.
Despite adverse selection having long come to play a central
role in information economics as perhaps the most pervasive
222
information problem, no attention has been paid to it in the
context of the shareholder-manager relationship.
Exploring adverse selection in this context is not just about
academic rigor but rather involves issues of descriptive complexity that bear crucial normative implications. As this Article
has shown, once one incorporates both issues of adverse selection and managerial moral hazard, a governance model with
stronger board authority in the short term and enhanced
shareholders’ rights in the longer term emerges as normatively
more desirable than either the traditional board-centric model
or the competing shareholder primacy model of the corporation.
On the one hand, shareholder advocates fail to recognize
that granting the board of directors exclusive authority in the
short term provides a beneficial commitment to “timeconsistent” removal decisions, which shareholders are otherwise unable to ensure in light of adverse selection and uninformative short-term prices. Market prices may be uninformative in the short term when a firm’s investments in specific
long-term projects, such as investments in innovation or other
intangibles, make prices unable to fully capture the implications of managerial private information until those implications
begin to show up in cash flows over time. Under this possibility—which is especially severe today as intangibles have come
to represent the bulk of corporate production—economic theory
predicts that shareholders would benefit from committing to

221. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *22 (holding that the trigger will be
deemed reasonable and will not be deemed to thwart the shareholder franchise as long as a shareholder with an ownership stake up to the trigger level
can effectively run a proxy contest).
222. See supra note 104.
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evaluate managerial decisions in the longer term when prices
are more likely to be fully informative.
Yet, faced with adverse selection—the risk of hiring a “bad
manager” who does not respond to incentives for optimal project selection—shareholders are unable to credibly commit to
time-consistent removal decisions. Conversely, because of the
higher likelihood that bad managers might be associated with
disappointing firm outcomes and the risk of false matching,
shareholders will rationally react to a low short-term firm outcome by exercising their power of removing incumbents although that outcome might in fact be a reflection of uninformative short-term prices. In response, good managers struggling
to avoid removal are likely as well to become unresponsive to
incentives for optimal project selection and engage in “strategic
signaling,” developing a preference for short-termist projects
that can improve the shareholders’ perception of their type.
This analytical framework not only exposes short-termism
as a much more pervasive problem than recognized by shareholder advocates, but it also reframes board protection as a corrective that mitigates such a problem by “exploiting” a board’s
bias toward retaining incumbent management. In light of this
bias, a board that is insulated from shareholder discipline—and
hence holds exclusive decision-making power on managerial
removal decisions—reduces the risk of the inefficient removal
of good managers and, hence, short-termism. At the same time,
however, board protection might jeopardize optimal project selection if it becomes perpetual. Indeed, as a biased board is less
likely to remove a good manager in the short term, so it is less
likely to remove a bad manager in the longer term when removal would be the efficient decision to make.
Accordingly, this Article questions the recent rise of shareholder empowerment under which boards of directors have
grown increasingly less able to gain protection from short-term
shareholder pressure. Mainly, this outcome is due to the decreased effectiveness of defensive measures such as staggered
boards and poison pills, as hedge funds and other activists have
gained the ability to coerce board approval to dismiss these defenses or otherwise sneak past them. Unsurprisingly—but not
less worrisome—the result of these transformative changes is
that corporate America is moving away from long-term value
creation and toward short-term consumption.
To reverse this trend, and at the same time preserve the
long-term benefits of shareholder empowerment, a coordinated
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private ordering response by institutional investors and U.S.
boards of directors would be the most politically feasible option.
This response would include reinstating the limitations to
short-term shareholder interference and transforming them into meaningful high-order constraints while also ensuring that
these limitations have a finite, rather than perpetual, life. This
Article has outlined broad strokes of how to implement such solutions. However, the greatest advantage of opting for a private
ordering response would be enabling market actors to devise
fine-tuned solutions that can cater to the specific needs of individual corporations.
APPENDIX
This Appendix offers an extended numerical version of the
qualitative illustration this Article introduces in Part II.A and
then uses throughout the discussion. This extended example
draws more heavily on contract theory in order to simultaneously consider the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection to which shareholders are exposed and, thereby, better
elucidate the related tradeoff as well as its implications for the
optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders.
A. SETTING AND MAIN ASSUMPTIONS
The example’s setting and assumptions are the same as
those of the illustration introduced in Part II although the
temporal horizon is that of the modified version of the illustration discussed in Part IV.A with three periods: the short term,
the medium term, and the long term (at the end of which the
company is liquidated). For convenience, Appendix Figure 1
provides a summary description of the projects considered by
the example.
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Appendix Figure 1: Projects’ Description

As shown by Appendix Figure 1, the numerical example attributes a value of twelve to the private benefit a Good Manager is expected to receive when she undertakes the Regular Pro224
ject rather than the Innovative Project. It also assumes that a
Bad Manager can extract a private benefit of 200 when pursuing the Bad Project, attempting to capture the fact that the use
of reward mechanisms is unhelpful in the case of adverse selection, either because bad types fail to respond to incentives or
designing an incentive-compatible contract is too onerous for
225
the principal. Further, the example makes the additional
standard assumptions that (i) both shareholders and managers
are risk neutral agents and do not discount future gains; (ii) a
manager’s reservation utility, regardless of her type, is zero;
and (iii) managers are protected by limited liability.

223. As clearly shown by Figure 1, because each project delivers the same
payoff across the three periods, although with different probabilities, the
shareholders can at best have an inference of the manager’s type and actions
but cannot verify either one. Further, it is also worth emphasizing that under
the assumption of risk neutrality, the shareholders are indifferent to receiving
a payoff of 250 with probability 40% or a payoff of 100 with certainty. However, if the shareholders received 100 with certainty in the long term (rather
than 250 with a 40% probability), they could easily infer that the manager undertook the Regular Project rather than the Innovative Project (which delivers
250 with certainty in the final term). This, however, would contradict the
standard assumption that shareholders cannot observe what projects managers undertake.
224. See supra text accompanying note 114.
225. See supra Part III.B. It is worth emphasizing that the private benefit
a Bad Manager extracts from the Bad Project could be even zero if the manager does not respond to incentives for type-related reasons.
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B. INCENTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADVERSE SELECTION
For convenience, in using this expanded numerical example to elucidate the consequences that the combination of moral
hazard and adverse selection issues produces for the shareholders’ optimization problem, let us begin by assuming that
the manager population only includes Good Managers. Under
this assumption, a prospective manager’s incentive compatibility constraint will be satisfied under a compensation contract
226
that grants the manager a 12% equity stake as this compensation scheme makes it individually efficient for the manager to
pursue the Innovative Project. Condition 1 below quantifies
this circumstance:
0.12×(0.8×100+0.8×100+1×250) ≥
0.12×(1×100+1×100+0.4×250)+12 (1)
where the left-hand side of Condition (1) represents the manager’s expected payoff from pursuing the Innovative Project
(49.2) and the right-hand side represents her expected payoff
from pursuing the Regular Project (48) under the 12% equitystake plan. Under this circumstance, the shareholders’ expected payoff is then equal to 0.88×410=360.8.
However, once one moves to incorporate adverse selection
into the shareholders’ optimization problem, offering a prospective manager the above compensation contract no longer ensures the shareholders that the manager will undertake the
Innovative Project. This is because in a world where shareholders lack viable mechanisms to separate managerial types ex
227
ante, the shareholders will only hire a Good Manager with an
80% probability. With the remaining 20% probability, they will,
instead, hire a Bad Manager. This possibility, in turn, reduces
the shareholders’ expected payoff from the venture from 360.8
228
to 292.2, where the reduction in expected payoff arises because inducing a Bad Manager to behave is too costly (or oth229
erwise unfeasible) for the shareholders.
226. The manager’s incentive compatibility constraint would also be satisfied by an 11% equity stake, but selecting a compensation plan with a 12% equity stake helps keep the computations more manageable.
227. See supra Part II.C.1.
228. The shareholders’ expected payoff in an economy including both Good
and Bad Managers is calculated as follows:
0.88×[0.8×(0.8×100+0.8×100+250)+0.2×(0.1×100+0.1×100)]=292.2.
229. In theory, the shareholders could raise monetary incentives to make
the contract incentive compatible also for the Bad Manager; however, doing so
is likely to be unprofitable to the shareholders. See supra Part II.C.2. Indeed,
in order to make the undertaking of the Innovative Project individually re-
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C. SHORT-TERM REMOVAL AND STRATEGIC SIGNALING
Let us now assume that the shareholders can also remove
the manager at the end of the short term as it increasingly
tends to be the case in the current corporate scenario with empowered shareholders. For simplicity, the example also assumes that the manager’s removal is followed by the company’s
230
(anticipated) liquidation. Last, it also poses that removing the
manager yields shareholders a legacy value of 160 (i.e., eighty
231
for each hypothetical remaining period), consistent with the
assumption that the shareholders’ power of removal helps to
reduce the cost they bear for the hire of a Bad Manager.
Under these assumptions, upon observing a payoff of 100
at the end of the short term, the shareholders will then apply
the Bayes’ Rule and update their belief on the manager’s type
so to deem that the manager is Good with a 97% probability
(i.e., (0.8×0.8)/(0.8×0.8+0.2×0.1)=0.97). Under this belief, they
will not remove the manager as their expected continuation
payoff (i.e., the overall payoff the shareholders obtain from
232
233
keeping the manager until the long term) is equal to 281.9,
which is higher than the legacy value of 160.
Conversely, when the shareholders observe a zero payoff at
the end of the short term (which may only come from either the
Innovative Project or the Bad Project), they will believe there is
only a 47.1% ((0.8×0.2)/[(0.8×0.2)+(0.2×0.9)]=0.471) chance they
are dealing with a Good Manager. Under this posterior, their

warding for the Bad Manager, the shareholders should promise her a compensation percentage (comp. %) that solves the following incentive compatibility
constraint: (comp. %)×(410)≥(comp. %)×(20)+200, which delivers a compensation percent of around 51.3%.
230. In actuality, removal of incumbents will typically be followed by the
appointment of new management, but the assumption of liquidation causes no
loss of generality in our example.
231. A payoff of eighty per period approximates what the shareholders expect to receive in an economy including both Good Managers and Bad Managers if they provide no equity incentives to the manager and have no removal
right. Since under these circumstances a Good Manager would always pursue
the Regular Project, the shareholder’s expected value would be computed as
follows: [(0.8×300)+(0.2×20)]/3=81.3.
232. The shareholders’ expected continuation payoff is the pooling price at
which the company stock is traded. As explained in the text, the pooling price
can be high or low depending on whether the investors observe a payoff of 100
or zero at the end of the short term.
233. The shareholders’ expected continuation payoff when they believe they
are dealing with a Good Manager with probability 97% is determined as follows: 0.88×[0.97×(0.8×100+250)+0.03×(0.1×100)]=281.9.
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234

continuation payoff reduces to 141.3, so they will rationally
decide to remove the manager.
A Good Manager, however, will anticipate that she will
continue to be employed only if the shareholders observe 100 at
the end of the short term. This will occur with probability 80%
when the manager chooses the Innovative Project while it will
occur with certainty if she chooses the safer Regular Project. It
is then easy to see that when the shareholders can remove the
manager in the short term, the incentives the Good Manager
develops for strategic signaling will make pursuing the Innovative Project no longer profitable to her under the 12% equity
plan. Indeed, when a Good Manager is exposed to the risk of
losing her continuation value (i.e., the payoffs from future employment periods), her incentive compatibility constraint no
longer holds, as shown by Condition (2):
0.12×(0.8×100+0.8×0.8×100+0.8×250) <
0.12×(100+100+0.4×250)+12 (2)
where the left-hand side of Condition (2) represents the manager’s expected payoff from pursuing the Innovative Project
(41.3) and the right-hand side represents the manager’s payoff
from pursuing the Regular Project (48).
Condition (2) then clearly shows that the higher expected
cost the manager bears for the risk of losing her continuation
value under the Innovative Project (relative to the Regular Project) outweighs the value of the reward she receives when she
235
undertakes that project.

234. The shareholders’ expected continuation payoff when they believe they
are dealing with a Good Manager with probability 47.1% is determined as follows: 0.88×[0.471×(0.8×100+250)+0.529×(0.1×100)]=141.4.
235. Choosing the Regular Project is the only Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
for the Good Manager when she is exposed to the threat of short-term removal. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 320–24
(1991) (explaining Perfect Bayesian equilibrium). Under these circumstances,
the shareholders’ expected payoff reduces to 241.9. This amount is calculated
as follows:
0.88×[0.8×(100+100+0.4×250)+0.2×(0.1×100+0.1×0.1×100)]
+(0.2×0.9×160)=241.9,
where (0.2×0.9×160) is the payoff the shareholders expect to receive when they
fire a Bad Manager at the end of the short term with 0.2 being the proportion
of Bad Managers, 0.9 being the probability that a Bad Manager taking the
Bad Project generates zero payoff at the end of the short term, and 160 being
the shareholders’ legacy value. It is also worth emphasizing that if one relaxes
the example’s assumption that the manager is risk-neutral and assumes that
she is risk-averse (as might be the case), the manager will have even greater
incentives to engage in strategic signaling.
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In order for the manager’s equity compensation plan to
continue to be incentive-compatible when the shareholders can
remove the manager at the end of the short term, the share236
holders should increase the manager’s equity stake to 28%.
Such an increase, however, would make the pursuing of the Innovative Project no longer profitable to the shareholders. Under
the circumstances the shareholders would only expect to re237
ceive 254.1, which is less than the 292.2 they expect to receive when they have no removal power and are thus fully ex238
posed to the problem of adverse selection.

236. A compensation plan granting the manager a 28% equity stake satisfies the following incentive compatibility constraint:
0.28×(0.8×100+0.8×0.8×100+0.8×250) ≥ 0.28×(100+100+0.4×250)+12.
This means that in order for the Good Manager to have the right incentives to
undertake the Innovative Project when the shareholders have the right to remove her in the short term, the manager should receive 96.3.
237. Under a compensation plan granting the manager a 28% equity stake,
the shareholders expect to receive the following:
0.72×[0.8×(0.8×100+0.8×0.8×100+0.8×250)+
0.2×(0.1×100+0.1×0.1×100)]+(0.8×0.2×160)+(0.2×0.9×160)=254.1,
where (0.8×0.2×160) is the payoff the shareholders expect to receive when they
fire a Good Manager at the end of the short term, with 0.8 being the proportion of Good Managers, 0.2 being the probability that a Good Manager taking
the Innovative Project generates zero payoff at the end of the short term, and
160 being the shareholders’ legacy value. Similarly, (0.2×0.9×160) is the payoff
the shareholders expect to receive when they fire a Bad Manager at the end of
the short term.
238. The amount the shareholders expect to receive under the attribution
of a 28% equity stake to the manager, 254.1, is also lower than the amount
they could obtain without any equity incentives, but they would retain the option of firing the manager at the end of the short term, i.e., 271. Because without equity incentives the good manager would always take the Regular Project, the shareholders expect to receive the following:
1×[0.8×(1×100+1×100+0.4×250)+0.2×
(0.1×100+0.1×0.1×100+0×250)]+(0.2×0.9×160)=271.
Note that this amount is also higher than what the shareholders expect to receive when they have the right to remove the manager at the end of the shortterm under the original 12% equity plan, i.e., 241.9. See equation supra note
235. This suggests that the use of incentives when the shareholders are empowered to short-term removal grants the manager a pure rent, as these incentives cannot induce optimal project selection. In the jargon of shareholder
advocates, this would be “pay-without-performance.” See supra note 61 and
accompanying text. What these advocates do not see, however, is that a shareholders’ removal power that can be exercised at any time, including the near
term, is the cause, not the solution, to this problem.
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D. THE VALUE OF TIME-CONSISTENT REMOVAL
Let us now consider the case in which the shareholders
cannot remove the manager until the end of the mediumterm—as it would occur under this Article’s proposal for the
adoption of a time-consistent removal regime. Similar to the
representation of short-term removal in Appendix Section C,
the example poses that removing the manager yields the
shareholders a legacy value of eighty; incorporating the benefit
removal delivers as an ex post remedy against adverse selec239
tion.
In this case, the shareholders will be able to rely on the observation of a stream of payoffs (as well as the observation of
these payoffs’ order) rather than just one payoff to derive an inference on the manager’s type. Analytically, this means that
they will apply the Bayes’ Rule sequentially in order to update
their beliefs on the manager’s type so that the shareholders’
posteriors after observing any possible combination of payoffs
yielded in the short- and medium-term will be the following:
(i)

Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 100 & 100] =
(0.97×0.8)/(0.97×0.8+0.03×0.1)=0.998. This posterior
is computed by updating the previous posterior of
97% after observing 100 at the end of the short
term;

(ii)

Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 0 & 0] =
(0.471×0.2)/(0.471×0.2+0.529×0.9)=0.165. This posterior is computed by updating the previous posterior 47.1% after observing 0 at the end of the short
term;

(iii) Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 100 & 0] =
(0.97×0.2)/(0.97×0.2+0.03×0.9)=0.877. This posterior
is computed by updating the previous posterior of
97% after observing 100 at the end of the medium
term;
(iv)

Prob[Manager = Good|Observing 0 & 100] =
(0.471×0.8)/(0.471×0.2+0.529×0.1)=0.877. This posterior is computed by updating the previous posterior of 47.1% after observing 0 at the end of the medium term.

Like in the short-term removal case, the shareholders’ possible removal decisions are assessed by comparing the continu239. The legacy value when the shareholders have a medium-term removal
right reduces from 160 to 80 as there is only one remaining period (i.e., the
long term). See supra note 231.
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ation value the shareholders obtain by keeping the manager for
the long term to the legacy value of eighty they obtain by firing
the manager in the medium term. Under the above posterior
beliefs, it is then easy to see that the shareholders will fire the
manager only when they observe two consecutive zero payoffs.
This is so because only upon the observation of these realizations, the continuation value accruing to the shareholders is
lower than the legacy value of eighty (i.e., 0.88×(0.165
240
×250)<80). Consistent with the result that over time prices
tend to be more informative about managerial types, it is likewise easy to see that the probability the shareholders will correctly fire a Bad Manager increases over time. Indeed, the
probability that a Bad Manager will produce two consecutive
zero payoffs in the medium term—and hence will be correctly
fired—is 0.9×0.9=0.81. Conversely, that probability is
0.2×0.2=0.04 for a Good Manager, meaning that the probability
shareholders may mistakenly fire a Good Manager reduces to
4% under a time-consistent removal regime.
Correspondingly, the example shows that such a regime
avoids interfering with a Good Manager’s incentives to select
the Innovative Project as a Good Manager anticipates that
there is a much lower probability that she will be fired if she
chooses the Innovative Project under a time-consistent removal
regime. Indeed, once this circumstance is incorporated into the
manager’s incentive compatibility constraint, this constraint
changes as follows (relative to the case of short-term removal
shown under Condition (2)):
0.12×(0.8×100+0.8×100+0.96×250) ≥
0.12×(100+100+0.4×250)+12 (3)
where the left-hand side of Condition (3) represents the Good
Manager’s expected payoff from undertaking the Innovative
Project and the right-hand side represents her expected payoff
from undertaking the Regular Project. As the left-hand side
and the right-hand side of Condition (3) yields the same result,
the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, meaning that
241
the manager will select the Innovative Project.

240. It is also easy to verify that for all the other cases, the continuation
value the shareholders obtain by retaining the manager is higher than 80.
241. In contract theory, when the incentive compatibility constraint is
binding (i.e., the values are the same), it is standard to assume that an agent
will behave (i.e., she will take the action preferred by the principal). See
TIROLE, supra note 23, at 118.
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Last, because of the reduced likelihood of strategic signaling, the benefits shareholders expect to obtain for constraining
adverse selection through the exercise of removal outweighs the
cost they bear for the risk of short-termism. On the one hand,
the expected loss to shareholders for mistakenly firing a Good
Manager under this modified removal regime is reduced to 4%,
implying that shareholders bear a corresponding 4% probability of losing the difference between what they would get by retaining a Good Manager in the long term and the eighty legacy
value. After this probability is weighted for the population of
Good Managers (80%), the expected cost to shareholders for
242
mistakenly firing a Good Manager is thus 4.5. This loss, however, is more than compensated by what the shareholders expect to gain from the increased 81% probability of correctly firing a Bad Manager, implying that the shareholders have a
corresponding probability of gaining the difference between the
eighty legacy value and what they would receive by keeping a
Bad Manager in the long term (i.e., zero). After this probability
is weighted for the population of Bad Managers (20%), the expected gain to the shareholders for correctly firing a Bad Man243
ager is thirteen, which largely exceeds the expected cost they
bear for firing a Good Manager.
E. BENEFICIAL AND EXCESSIVE BOARD’S BIAS
This last part of the numerical example addresses the
function of a board’s bias. To this end, as in Part IV.C, the example poses that the board’s bias, β, is equal to 0.2 so that the
shareholders will deem a manager to be Good at the end of the
short term after observing a zero payoff with probability
0.2×1+(1–0.2)×0.471=57.7 (where 0.471 is the shareholders’
unbiased posterior belief under the same short-term realization). Under this posterior the shareholders’ continuation pay-

242. This amount is calculated as follows: (0.8×0.04)×[(0.88×250)-80]=4.5,
where 0.8 is the probability of hiring a Good Manager, 0.04 is the probability
that a Good Manager who selects the Innovative Project will generate two consecutive zero payoffs, (0.88×250) is the long-term shareholders’ payoff from the
Innovative Project net of the manager’s equity incentives, and 80 is the shareholders’ legacy value.
243. This amount is calculated as follows: (0.2×0.81)×80=13, where 0.2 is
the probability of hiring a Bad Manager, 0.81 is the probability that a Bad
Manager who selects a Bad Project generates two consecutive zero payoffs,
and 80 is the shareholder payoff when the shareholders fire the manager in
the medium term.
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244

off becomes 171.2, which is higher than the legacy value of
245
160. Therefore, the board will not remove the manager.
Now, if the board’s bias remained the same over time, it is
easy to see that the board would remove the manager after observing two consecutive zero payoffs in the medium term. Under these circumstances, the board’s posterior belief that the
246
manager is Good is 32.2%. Based on this posterior, the shareholders’ continuation payoff for retaining the manager for the
long term is 0.88×(0.322×250)=73.4, which is lower than the
legacy value of eighty the shareholders receive if the board removes the manager.
In actuality, however, it is plausible to assume that a
board’s bias may increase over time due to greater entrenchment between boards and managers. Let us thus assume that
in the medium term, the board’s bias increases from 0.2 to 0.3,
which is a slight, conservative increase. Still, under this greater bias, the board’s posterior belief that the manager is Good
247
upon two consecutive zero payoffs would increase to 41.6%.
As a result, the board would mistakenly assess the shareholder
continuation value for retaining the manager as being equal to
0.88×(0.416×250)=91.4, which is higher than the legacy value of
eighty. Therefore, a biased board in the long term would not
remove the manager, reducing shareholder and firm value.

244. The shareholders’ expected continuation payoff when they believe they
are dealing with a Good Manager with probability 47.1% is determined as follows: 0.88×[0.577×(0.8×100+250)+0.423×(0.1×100)]=171.2.
245. The assumption here is that the board is biased “in good faith” and
hence will consider the shareholders’ continuation payoff based on its own updated posterior of the manager’s type to decide on the manager’s removal.
However, even in the case of a board that is biased “in bad faith,” the shareholders’ continuation payoff may still matter to the board as a reference point
to consider to avoid a possible fiduciary action.
246. When the bias β=0.2, the board’s posterior is (0.8×16.5)+(0.2×1)=0.322.
247. When the bias β=0.3, the board’s posterior is (0.7×16.5)+(0.3×1)=0.416.

